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Fiftieth Conference of the Interparliamentary Union and the Fifth East-West Round Table Conference

By Dr. Mladen IVEKOVIC

A PART from the Belgrade Conference of the Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, many other international gatherings which took place recently, showed that tendencies and actions aimed at discovering new possibilities for beginning honest talks on major and fateful world issues have appeared almost simultaneously in the East and in the West. But, without any doubt, it was the Belgrade Conference and its conclusions which induced responsible international factors and influential personalities, who had, perhaps, begun to lose any hope of checking the cold war, to reconsider matters and make fresh efforts to improve understanding between the East and West. The Belgrade Conference, was the first to thoroughly analyze current relations in the world, particularly between the two big military-political alliances, and inequality between nations. Secondly, the Belgrade Conference indicated the way towards a reasonable solution of these difficulties by means of honest negotiations. This could not remain without effect on the further developments and the positions of all nations, especially the great nuclear powers, which are standing behind the barricades of their increasingly conflicting views, trying to gain the maximum possible

advantages before the inevitable confrontation of their attitudes at the green table and in the United Nations. Irrespective of a certain amount of reserve on the part of some powers and circles in the world as regards the non-aligned countries and the Belgrade Conference the fact remains that — willingly or not — both sides have found themselves in a position which forces them to recognize the significance of this new factor in the international field and they must reckon with this factor. It has been and is still doing all it can towards pacification and towards seeking a way out of the present difficult international situation.

In this respect (and, naturally, this is closely linked with the present tension in East-West relations which has never been greater since the Second World War), it is noteworthy that, after the Belgrade Conference and on the eve of the 16th session of the United Nations General Assembly, some other international gathering considerably, gained in importance precisely because they took place at a time when the world was particularly anxious to preserve world peace and because the subjects of their discussion did not greatly differ from those on the agenda of the Belgrade Conference. For that matter, their subjects were at the

same time the main items on the agenda of the present session of the U.N. general assembly. At these meetings there was a definitely marked tendency to abandon academic discussions and propaganda tirades, and to promote contacts between the East and West and to suggest solutions for the most important problems in the East-West conflict.

There are many examples of this new, constructive tendency. The most interesting of them, however, became evident at the recent conference of the Interparliamentary Union in Brussels and the East-West round-table meeting in Rome. What these two gatherings had in common is the fact that representatives of various Eastern and Western countries did not represent their Governments but that, on the contrary, they belong to different political parties and that the meetings developed into useful discussions on the most important and the most dangerous aspects of East-West relations. The common characteristic of these meetings was that the former practice of oratorial duels based on bloc conceptions (here I am primarily thinking of the Interparliamentary Union, as the round-table meeting used not to be burdened by this practice even in the past played a minor role, and that all accepted as a "conditio sine qua non" the obligation and responsibility of a great majority of the participants and of the conferences to help strengthen peace and maintain correct international standards in relations between nations (big and small) with different socio-political systems. These international meetings showed that the conception of the peaceful coexistence of nations and of their understanding on all questions which threaten peace had made way to and won the support of the political circles and the prominent personalities whose influence on public opinion in their countries should not be underestimated. The policy leading to the acceptance of international standards mentioned above will inevitably come to the fore in all countries where the Governments feel the pulse of public opinion and rely on its support and confidence.

Some other unofficial international gatherings, such as a meeting of public workers, known as the European disarmament conference, held in Norway in June this year, a meeting of representatives of Western anti-nuclear movements and the World Movement for Peace which took place in London in September, can also be included in the group of such new international factors, capable of making efforts and willing to exert their influence on public opinion and Governments. Yugoslavia was also represented at these meetings. They too go to show that the fateful problem of peace and war and its causes are arousing increasing interest among all those who believe that the world must and can be preserved from a catastrophe.

Before the Second World War the Interparliamentary Union was an exclusively Western organization (Western — in regard to the socio-political order of the bourgeois society) which considered during the decades of its existence the problems of the Western parliamentary life and standards of the bourgeois society. It upheld the view that its parliamentary democracy was the greatest achievement of democracy in general. After the war the union was joined by sixty countries from Europe, Africa, Asia and Latin America. Parallel with this, changes took place not only in the Organization's structure, but also in its political orientation. The Interparliamentary Union ceased to be an exclusively Western organization, and its political homogeneity could be manifested in the international field only in questions which equally threatened the interests of all States, irrespective of their social

and parliamentary systems, i. e. in the question of war and peace and its effects on international relations. As a result of these changes, the Interparliamentary Union has found its place and has become a forum for constructive East-West dialogues on the problems dividing the world in the present complicated East-West relations and particularly in the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The fiftieth jubilee conference of the Interparliamentary Union recently held in Brussels showed the full value and advantages of such an orientation. The Conference agenda included the preservation of peace, liquidation of colonialism, assistance to underdeveloped countries, inter-governmental relations, i. e. the main causes of world tension; what should be particularly emphasized and what proved that the spirit of international cooperation was strong in the Interparliamentary Union, was the fact it unanimously adopted the Declaration on the principles which should be respected by individual countries in international relations, so as to remove international tension and promote peace. The Declaration was submitted by the Yugoslav delegation. It is inspired by the principles followed by our country in international relations. Over 300 Parliamentarians and politicians from all continents thus adopted a new and encouraging method of approaching vital international problems, a method which shows that the conception of international understanding has exceeded the framework of narrow bargaining between the big powers.

The same tendencies predominated at the East-West round table conference held in Rome in September this year. It is true that the composition and purposes of this conference considerably differ from those of universal organizations, such as the Interparliamentary Union. But, precisely because of its specific aims, it gained tremendously in importance during the Rome meeting, as it was held in an atmosphere of full understanding and goodwill and because it was influenced by the difficult international situation and increasingly complex East-West relations. This conference sought new solutions and formulae for the settling of the present crisis in mutual confidence. The round table East-West conference was first held a few years ago (the Rome conference was the fifth in succession) with the aim of establishing permanent contacts between individual public personalities from the countries of Western Europe, the Soviet Union, some East European countries and the United States. Consequently the number of participants is rather limited, however, for the present the conference is not aspiring to become universal. Accordingly, the round-table conferences are rather limited by the number of their participants while their tasks and aims are to seek common platforms in free discussions on the most important problems affecting East-West relations. Owing to the fact these discussions are held in closed sessions, to which the public is not admitted each participant is given full freedom in voicing his views, without introducing any propaganda elements. It is a fact that the round-table conferences have so far been far from aggravating inter-bloc conflicts and rhetoric propaganda. The participants from various countries do not represent their governments or political parties, but act as individual personalities.

The agenda of the Rome conference included such questions as disarmament, European security, Germany, the present crisis in the United Nations Organization, i. e. the key problems causing current international tension. It is difficult to evade the impression that the fifth round-table conference was fortunately synchronized with a series of international initiatives

aimed at easing international tension and promoting understanding between the Soviet Union and the United States. This very fact greatly increased its significance.

The conference was attended by many prominent personalities, such as the winner of the Nobel Prize for Peace, Philip Noel Baker, the British politicians Thompson and Ziliakus, Senator Rollin of Belgium, Soviet politicians and cultural workers Adjubei, Ilya Erenburg, Korneitchuk, Soloviev, Italian politicians Pietro Nenni, F. Pari, Lombardy, La Malfa, La Pira, Vitorelli, French public workers and parliamentarians Ansionnaz, d'Astier, Senator Mitteran, Jules Moch, the Norwegian politician, Finn Moe, Senator Branting of Sweden, Polish politicians, Turski and Dluski, and the Yugoslav delegates, Iveković and Vitorović, all of whom endeavoured to contribute to the successful work of the Rome gathering, Senator Humphrey of the United States, who arrived in Rome towards the end of the Conference, promised to bring a large group of American public workers and politicians to the next round-table conference. At the end of its work, the Conference issued a number of documents containing conclusions on all the items on the agenda, which had been passed unanimously and which reflected the wish of all participants to find a way out of the present cul-de-sac on the basis of mutually acceptable solutions.

To return now to what was said in the beginning of the article. We see that between the Belgrade Conference of non-aligned countries and this year's meeting of the Interparliamentary Union and the East-West Round-Table Conference, the same problems characterized a series of important international issues, i. e. identical or similar initiatives aimed at settling these issues. Even a superficial comparison of the agendas

and documents passed at these meetings would be sufficient to conclude that the idea on coexistence and understanding among nations has not only gained the support of a vast majority of people supporting the cause of peace, but also that it has become a force imperatively imposing itself on the governments and countries most responsible for the present difficult situation in international relations.

There is another significant thing. The Conclusions of the Belgrade Conference and the development of the non-aligned countries into a new factor in the international field were reflected in all the discussions at the mentioned international meetings. This likewise applies to the current, sixteenth meeting of the United Nations General Assembly. That this fact had to find adequate expression in the conclusions of these meetings — is logical and understandable. At both the Conference of the Interparliamentary Union in Brussels and the East-West Round-Table Conference in Rome (where Yugoslavia's delegates were the only representatives of the non-aligned countries), participants from both Western and the Eastern countries emphasized the significance of the Belgrade Conference and the efforts to promote understanding and to eradicate the causes of tension between the East and West, particularly between the Soviet Union and the United States. Undoubtedly, this is yet another proof of the correctness of our country's policy as well as the policy of other non-aligned states, and which came to such full expression in Belgrade at the beginning of September. This policy is constantly being further promoted through direct activities wherever the problem of world peace and of equality between all nations, big and small may arise.

CURRENT TOPICS

THE LESSON OF SYRIA

By N. DUBRAVČIC

PRESIDENT Nasser's decision not to resort to military force to put down the uprising in Damascus was the outcome of a sober and statesmanlike assessment of the problems, ordeals and dangers through which the cause of Arabian unification has passed and is still passing. Realistically speaking, it also meant the sanctioning of the secession of the Syrian Province of the United Arab Republic, which marks the end of an interesting and significant phase in recent Arab history.

Although the events in Syria aroused strong feeling in many people in the U.A.R. and throughout the Arab world, and provoked malicious comments in many other quarters, a thorough analysis of the birth and development of the Union justifies President Nasser and his conception of Arab unity and unification.

The formation of the U.A.R. in February 1958 came as the expression and realization of the natural aspirations of the Syrian and Egyptian peoples for

a common state, but at the same time it was a historical experiment, dictated predominantly by needs of foreign policy. Two peoples with a different historical and cultural heritage, and a different economic and social physiognomy, created, by the impulse of revolutionary enthusiasm, and under pressure of threats from abroad, a Union, which rested on the enthusiasm of the masses and the authority of President Nasser's strong personality, rather than on a strongly built internal base, while its actual aim was to protect Syria and the Arab East from imperialist expansion, which was endangering Syria in particular at that time. Thus this Union of the two states was formed which had a purpose but not a sufficiently solid foundation. Responding to momentary needs and to the general mood in favour of unification, the creators of the Union solved the problem inadequately: they proclaimed unification, without having made the indispensable preparations on the economic, social and politi-

tical plane. The enthusiasm called forth by this act in the Arab world gave rise to the delusive hope that the Union was resting on stronger pillars than was in fact the case. Egyptian and Syrian unity was given a formal framework, but the Union did not possess the full internal content which depended on the solution of a number of problems, differences and contrarieties.

To achieve this, however, was not easy, in view of the different courses the two peoples had taken in their history, and the numerous enemies which the U.A.R., not yet completely built up, and lacking in internal consolidation, had had to face since the hour of its birth.

The creation of the U.A.R. was a constructive factor, which played an important role in frustrating imperialist intervention in the Near East, by transforming this traditionally sensitive area into a realm of peace and constructive political development, and it won international recognition. The U.A.R. became one of the bastions of the non-aligned forces in the world, which also made it the target of many attacks and intrigues from abroad. Preoccupied as it was with problems of defense and foreign politics, the U.A.R. could not devote itself to a thorough and comprehensive solution of all the numerous, complicated and delicate tasks of the building up of the Union's internal structure. This meant a certain discrepancy between the international authority and the internal substance of the Union, which enabled the conservative feudal reaction to focus on its weakness and vulnerability, in struggling against the revolutionary measures to change

the economic and social structure of the country. The bourgeois reaction, endangered by the progressive social trends within Arab nationalism, was on the side of the U.A.R.'s enemies abroad, whose plans were hampered by the independent and non-aligned orientation of the Union.

The coup d'état in Syria, as the weakest spot of the Union, proved the correctness of the conception of all-Arab unity held by President Nasser from the very beginning: that unity must come as the result of long preparation and internal ripening, but not at all costs. This principle, coupled with his wish to avoid dangerous complications and imperialist infiltration in relation with Syria, was the motive for his realistic decision not to defend the Union by military action. For this reason the cause of Arab solidarity and unity will rest on a safer and sounder base, and cannot but become stronger after the events in Syria, in spite of the hard but valuable lesson they contain.

This experience will strengthen the progressive trends outlined by the U.A.R. and contribute to a broader, deeper and fuller assessment of the problems of Arab unity and the consolidation of an independent policy. Thus the first and most important lesson will lead to the closing of the ranks of the Arab countries, for the differences and contradictions between them — as reflected in recent events in Syria — have often in the past facilitated their undermining by pressure from abroad, directed both against their individual and their common interests.

VIEWS AND OPINIONS

THE QUESTION OF THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL

By L. ERVEN

WITHIN the framework of a more extensive reform of UNO, which is called for by the prevailing need for adjusting the structure of this international organization to suit the changed conditions both in its membership and in world relations, and even in the essence and aims of its tasks, the question of the re-organization of the UN executive apparatus, primarily of the position and functions of the Secretary General, presents itself as currently the most important one. This was an outstanding question even in the days of Dag Hammarskjold, but since his death it has taken on an exceptionally grave aspect, owing to the disagreement among the great powers, upon whom the appointment of his successor depends, over the scope and character of this re-organization. Since this concerns an organ which is entrusted with the Organization's regular and current functioning and which, according to its present structure, is alone responsible for the functioning of the World Organization, efforts are being made in New York, especially on the part of the non-aligned delegations, to find an immediate, com-

promise solution, even on a temporary basis, until the question of the definitive re-organization of the Secretariat is solved by normal channels, within a normal period of time, and in more favourable circumstances.

So far the United Nations has had only two Secretaries General. Dag Hammarskjold died in an accident, but even before that his mandate had been called into question. His predecessor, Trigve Lie, resigned before his mandate had expired, after having encountered the same difficulties. Thus experience has shown that the function of the Secretary General, as established in the Charter and carried out in practice, has created difficulties, and attracted criticism which has adversely affected the authority and functions of this organ, and accordingly this experience in itself is a serious reason for demanding changes which will help to prevent similar occurrences in future.

In some countries in the West, the idea of any change has met with opposition. This is explained by the fear that such change would upset the

hierarchic principle of the Secretariat which is essential for the maintenance of business discipline and promptitude, and would reduce the efficiency of the executive apparatus and consequently even debase the practical value of the United Nations and its jurisdiction. Walter Lipmann, the prominent American commentator, recently argued along these lines in the New York Herald Tribune. His view is that the United Nations needs a resolute and independent Secretary General who will handle this institution energetically, and prevent it from being turned into what he described as a "debating club".

Lipmann based his view on arguments which actually support the opposing thesis. His basic argument is as follows: "The United Nations had merely been an apparatus for conferring before Hammarskjold became Secretary General... In Laos, in Palestine and then in the Congo, he turned the United Nations from a debating club into an international force which adopted legal measures and followed a policy... In Laos, probably, and in the Congo certainly, Hammarskjold's activity obstructed and checked communist expansion so that, consequently, the Soviet Government is determined to abolish such functions of the Secretary General as were possessed by Hammarskjold.

Apparently Walter Lipmann attributes to the late Hammarskjold a role which, in his day, the late Secretary General had violently denied, in the face of the allegations of the Soviet Government that in his position of Secretary General he was pursuing an anti-Soviet policy. Irrespective of this, however, it would be wrong to view the question of the UN Secretary Generalship only in the light of the Soviet initiative, though if Lipmann's assertion were founded on fact, the Soviet initiative would be fully justified. Actually, the UN Secretary General is not called upon either to prevent or support any expansion, communist or capitalist, eastern or western, but to apply correctly the decisions of the United Nations' organs. On the other hand, the Soviet Government, even the entire eastern bloc, are not the only Government or group of states which consider a reform of the function of the Secretary General necessary. Lipmann's explanation is, therefore, unilateral, and inspired by motives which have already become an adverse tradition in bloc deliberations, that is, that all actions are judged exclusively from the point of view of bloc positions and bloc interests. The assertion that the Secretary General through his influence and activity alone transformed the United Nations from a debating club into an international force is obviously exaggerated. If, indeed, there have been some instances in which UN action proved to be effective and concrete, they should be judged in the light of the changes in international relations and the changed structure of the UNO membership. But if the argument concerning the influence of the Secretary General, the change of the very nature of the UNO, and its political force were correct, this would be an important reason for a reform of his function, for the playing of such a role by one official in the policy of the entire international organization would certainly have to be stopped.

There is some reason for the institution of the Secretary Generalship having met with difficulties and disapproval among part of the UN membership. The basic principles of this Organization were formulated in the days of war and at a time of full war solidarity among the Allies. The Charter was drawn up before difficulties had arisen in relations between the Allies, and before differences had appeared in

their policies. Like all the other UN institutions, the function of the Secretary General was conceived on the assumption of the existence of a greater degree of solidarity and harmony among the membership of the Organization than was shown in practice. The later development of relations among the Allies disproved the optimism of the founder of UNO. In the atmosphere of the cold war, conflicting differences division into blocs and partiality, the function of the Secretary General embodied in a single official — however authoritative and high-ranging — who would decide on his own on the method and measures of the implementation of all the decisions adopted by the Organization, was bound to encounter a crisis.

Hammarskjold himself contributed towards this crisis to a certain extent, though, of course, unwillingly. According to the provisions of the Charter, the Secretary General is the highest official of UNO, but only an official; with extensive powers and an important function, but only in the field of administrative functioning. Where the Charter does provide for a certain right of political assessment, it is restricted to initiative and suggestions. Dad Hammarskjold, however, in certain instances gave his powers a more extensive interpretation and a greater political importance than allowed for by the Charter and the essence of his function. This resulted in his appearance in the capacity of arbiter in complex issues over which the member countries disagreed among themselves with all the adverse consequences common to performance in such a capacity. It was inevitable, on all such occasions, that the Secretary General should have rendered the objectivity of his function questionable in the eyes of individual interested parties.

It should be pointed out, however, that the prevailing circumstances, too, were partly responsible for this expansion of the function of the Secretary General. On some occasions, the General Assembly and the Security Council, in order to cut short a debate or to avoid deliberations over the formulation of the wording of their decision, left the Secretary General a broad field of independent assessment in the implementation of the decisions, and thereby engaged his political responsibility in very delicate matters, over which the differences of the bloc powers were in sharp conflict. Thus the functioning of the Secretary General seriously endangered the general authority of his position which, in the Charter, had primarily been conceived as an executive, technical and politically neutral one. The Yugoslav view is that it is in the light of these arguments that a solution to the problem of the Secretary Generalship should be sought.

In his speech at the Belgrade Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, President Tito expressed the Yugoslav Government's view on this question. It is based on two fundamental ideas: a) the institution of the Secretary Generalship should be retained, but within the limits envisaged in the Charter, according to which the Secretary General is merely an administrative organ of UNO, with no autonomous political competences; b) the apparatus of the UN Secretariat should be organized in such a manner as will ensure that the Secretary General acts within the limits of the mentioned competence and providing that its structure should be adjusted to suit the changed conditions in UNO and in the world. For this purpose, an advisory body, composed of five or more members, should be established to assist the Secretary General, taking due account that

the recommendations and decisions of the corresponding UN organs are correctly understood.

From this general position the following conclusions may be drawn.

The unity of the executive function and the responsibility should be retained absolutely. The transference of this function to a college of equal members, as is provided for in the proposal for three secretaries, is liable to serious objections. First of all, the executive function, in itself, is not suitable for performance by a college, since the latter would retard and condition its execution, and in the final result, in some cases it might constitute a circumambulatory method of revision or suspension of a decision, such as would happen if the college failed to reach agreement. This weakness would come to full expression if the composition of the college were to be determined by the criterium of bloc division and bloc proportions. In such cases it would be difficult to establish an effective system of control and responsibility for the correct functioning of the administration and executive apparatus of UNO. A reform based on the principle of three secretaries would result in the indirect expansion of privileges already enjoyed by the great powers in the Security Council to the entire Organisation, whose activity would thus become subject to the interests of the Great Powers. The demand for a reform of the Secretary Generalship has arisen from the need that his function be freed from politics and from bias. The proposal for a collegial Secretary Generalship, on the principle of bloc representation, would have a contrary effect, for it would lead to an even

more powerful manifestation of bloc considerations, and the introduction of bloc conflicts in the executive function. For these and other reasons, such proposals have met with an unfavourable response from the majority of UN member countries.

The function of the Secretary General ought to be restored within the limits defined by the Charter, i. e., within the framework of administrative functioning and execution, according to which the Secretary General is only the administrative chief of UNO, with no independent political competences or authorization for political decisions of his own, in actions which he is required to undertake on behalf of the Organization. Any difficulties encountered with the Secretary General so far arose from his excursions into the political field, which is the responsibility of political representative bodies, and not the administrative organs of UNO.

An advisory body of a representative (but by no means bloc) character, whose composition would ensure a criterium of objectivity and geographical division, is required, in addition to a Secretary General. It would assist the Secretary General in his work and would see that all the decisions of UNO were correctly understood and implemented. The function of this advisory body would assume a special significance in cases when, in the executive function or in any other initiative of the Secretary General, it was impossible to avoid definite political decisions. A previous consultation between the Secretary General and the advisory body would certainly guarantee a more objective political assessment, and would protect the Secretary General from the criticisms to which he has been exposed so far.

NEW AND OLD IN DISARMAMENT TALKS

By N. OPĀČIC

THE debates on disarmament at this year's session of the UNO General Assembly have begun in an atmosphere characterized by a dangerous deterioration of relations between East and West. The prospects of progress are especially diminished by the sharpening crisis in connection with Berlin and the cessation of the moratorium on nuclear tests. This bloc conflict was strongly reflected in the general debate, as well as by the first acts of the great powers in the Political Committee, where the representatives of both parties approached the problem of disarmament from the position of cold-war and propagandist competition. Moreover, outside the United Nations, the blocs launched a general offensive on a broad front — from Brazil through Laos, South Viet Nam, Syria and Katanga to Ghana — against the progressive trends of non-aligned policy, in an attempt to weaken the strength and diminish the significance of the new, non-bloc factor which is working for pacification and the limiting of the territory of bloc activity.

Judging from the verbal declarations of the great powers, efforts towards disarmament have not been without result, despite the general aggravation of the crisis in international relations. In the records of the proposals and counterproposals from both sides, two

documents stand out as new and encouraging. First, there is the Soviet-American document on the jointly accepted principles which are to serve as a basis for the continuation of disarmament talks. This document is the outcome of the talks between Macleod and Zorin. Second, the USA government has definitely accepted the idea of general and complete disarmament, abandoning its previous plan of partial measures. President Kenedy informed the General Assembly of the American variant of the idea of general and complete disarmament.

These two facts constitute a platform, jointly accepted and proclaimed, on which further talks and efforts to reach agreement on disarmament should be based.

It should be emphasized that the Soviet-American document accepts many principles which were laid down by the non-aligned countries in the draft for their resolution at last year's session of the General Assembly. A world without war and without arms for war is fixed in the Soviet-American document as the aim to be achieved by disarmament. The other principles contained in it are counterpoised disarmament, which would not give advantage to any power over others; functional connection between disarmament and

strict international control; and a jointly adopted method for confirming and stating in the document principles which are not in dispute.

These are the same principles to which the non-aligned countries pledged themselves when submitting their resolution draft in November last. This draft, however, was opposed by the Western Powers, on the grounds that it supported the Soviet plan of general and complete disarmament, while neglecting the western idea of partial measures. The fact that the leading powers of the West have now accepted the principles they rejected a year ago proves that the proposals of the non-aligned countries reflected the general needs and tendencies of mankind so strongly that it would have been very unpopular to abandon them.

Although lacking the degree of practicability and force of last year's proposal of the non-aligned countries, the American document marks a constructive change, acceptable as a starting point for further talks.

Thus there are two plans for general and complete disarmament before the General Assembly: the Soviet and the American; while their joint document sums up certain ideas from both. From this progress it might be inferred that the chances for disarmament had increased and things were looking hopeful. But such a conclusion would be premature and without an essential basis. The actions of the great powers in UNO and their methods of approaching problems show, unfortunately, that the great differences between the Western and the Soviet attitude are unchanged, and that the differences shown in last year's debate on disarmament are still unbridged. In the Political Committee both sides have taken stands which, instead of expressing the readiness to contribute to the solution of this important problem, are but the reflection of their general disagreement. The verbal projects of both sides have again manifested themselves as instruments of propaganda for the neutralization of the declaration of the adversary in the eyes of the world public. This is the only explanation of the paradox that, in spite of certain mutual views and the formal acceptance of common principles, the solution of the problem of disarmament has become more difficult than ever. The principles for negotiation are laid down, but neither side shows readiness to sit down at a round table with the serious intention of making a sincere and honest effort to reach agreement.

If it is admitted that the agreement on disarmament has never been a technical problem but a political one, it is obvious that overtures for such an agreement cannot be made on the basis of formal, verbal proposals or technical schemes, but only through persevering efforts to improve political relations throughout the world. In recent years the great powers have often changed their attitude and their plans regarding disarmament, their views sometimes approaching and sometimes becoming more distant, but without practical results. The advance of disarmament does not depend on formulae or proposals by the great powers, inspired by the cold war and mutual conflict, but on the actual situation of international relations, particularly between East and West. Today, just as yesterday, this progress depends solely on their readiness to renounce the elements of force, pressure and threats in their policy, and to give up their aspirations for domination and interference in the life of other countries.

The non-aligned countries have pointed out more than once that the real chances for understanding on

disarmament can increase only along with the easing of international tension and the strengthening of world cooperation on the basis of equal rights and peaceful co-existence. These two aims are interrelated to an extent which transforms them into two aspects of one and the same problem: the struggle for the improvement of international relations, particularly between East and West, is at the same time the struggle for disarmament.

When things are viewed from this aspect, it is unrealistic to believe that no agreement on disarmament can be achieved unless both sides have found a perfect technical and organizational formula. This condition is important, but not decisive. It is known that the two parties conducted disarmament talks two years ago although they had no common platform; and while they have a common platform now, they are not even thinking of holding talks. This means that there is no crisis in plans or formulae, but a crisis in confidence and in international relations. To improve the international atmosphere and relations between the big powers, whose disarmament is the actual matter at issue, it is not so important to find a perfect formula for disarmament as it is to find a solution to a number of pending problems and disputes which generate tension. This is a complexity of contradiction and conflict created by fear, distrust and the arms race; and it is the reflection of the policy of force, which is unable to achieve its own negation until it renounces force. To solve this complexity and to tackle these problems is to pave the way for disarmament.

Another unrealistic approach is to insist on priority. Disarmament is an urgent task of mankind, but it is also a long-term objective, linked with many other international questions, and subject to their solution. Unless such crisis as those of Berlin, Laos and others are peacefully eliminated through negotiation it is illusory to expect that the great powers will accept actual disarmament. But the chief obstacles to disarmament being the political concepts, methods and practice of the great powers, it is essential, if any success is to be achieved in this field, that the great powers should give up their philosophy of force and their reliance on it.

The problems of priority of the individual aspects of disarmament is similar. In the Political Committee, for instance, the two parties are disputing as to whether the American and British proposal for the ban of atomic test should take priority, and be discussed separately, or — as demanded by the U.S.S.R. — only within the framework of talks on general and complete disarmament. Both parties have approached this acute problem from the position of mutual conflict and measuring of balance. If there were a genuine wish to reach an agreement on this matter, the problem of the ban on nuclear tests could be solved without difficulty, either within or without the framework of general disarmament talks. But in view of the dangerous degree reached in the nuclear tests race,¹ the Indian proposal for an immediate moratorium for nuclear tests, as a form of truce without prejudice to future agreements, is appropriate.

The non-aligned countries have taken the most realistic stand on disarmament. While recognizing it as

¹ According to data published by the Toronto "Financial Times" the stores of nuclear bombs and nuclear warheads in the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. have a total power of about 55 milliard tons of TNT, or 15 tons per capita for all men, women and children in the world.

an imperative necessity of mankind today, they have set it in its proper place — within a wider framework of demands to be fulfilled so as to establish a new democratic practice founded on the principles of active and peaceful co-existence, which would automatically eliminate the use of force and arms. The bloc practice prevailing hitherto has only led to sharper polemics and conflicts in the field of disarmament. The non-aligned

countries consider that things should be handled differently — by negotiation which would lead to the understanding of unsolved problems, for the sake of the general interests of peace. In view of previous experience, the non-aligned countries should participate in all future disarmament talks, for their presence would secure a realistic approach, on a broader political platform, to this problem, and give it its true proportions.

COMMENTS

FATAL HESITATION

EARLY this month President de Gaulle again asked the French public for support of his policy in Algeria; and for grave reasons. The situation in this part of North African country is extremely dangerous: the terror of the extremists and the clandestine military organisation, which have the support of the majority of French colonists who enjoy full freedom in their anti-state actions, threatens to spread to the Mediterranean and to provoke violence in France herself.

Just as in 1958, when the crisis was formally settled by de Gaulle's coming to power, the French-Algerian conflict is the centre of political agitation. While the optimists believe the final liquidation of the conflict to be near, the atmosphere is becoming more and more strained. The difficulties facing de Gaulle are caused, not only by the subversive actions of the extremists in Algeria, but also by the dissatisfaction of the democratic public with the slow evolution of the President's Algerian plans. Realizing that forty months, the period during which de Gaulle has already been in power, is long enough to come to the right decision, the public has begun to draw up a balance sheet of the irreparable damage caused by the seven years' war to France, not only by hindering her internal consolidation, but also by paralysing her constructive activity in European and world policy.

In view of the present state of affairs it cannot be denied that the situation in Algeria, and even in France herself, offers conditions for the solution of the Algerian problem on the basis of the natural right of the Algerian people to independence and self-determination. Although the acts of violence committed by the extremists in Oran and throughout Algeria cannot be regarded with indifference, the provisional Algerian government showed tact and high political responsibility in offering de Gaulle an honourable opportunity for the immediate resumption of negotiations for a peaceful settlement of the conflict. It goes without saying that postponement by the French party to these negotiations cannot but worsen French-Algerian relations and prolong the exhausting war, without any prospect of a military solution.

In his recent speech to the French nation, de Gaulle again confirmed his determination to end the war in Algeria, but he again avoided defining the way in which he intends to carry out this historical necessity. Nobody doubts that the French president is under-

going a severe ordeal, and it cannot be denied that his last speech, in which the variant of "making Algeria French" was abandoned, showed obvious progress towards the full recognition of the legitimate rights of the Algerians. But his last plan of setting up a provisional regime in Algeria to supervise the referendum does not contain any guarantee that the negative attitude which brought about the interruption of the talks at Evian and Ligren has been dropped.

As is known, the failure of these negotiations (which had been welcomed by the peaceloving world public as the right way towards a peaceful liquidation of the conflict) was caused by France's refusal to recognize two elementary rights of the Algerian people. First, official Paris persistently evaded acknowledging the provisional government's status as the only legitimate representative of the Algerian people to full national and territorial sovereignty. The machinations with Sahara became especially manifest at Ligren.

Not even in his last speech did de Gaulle make any clear statement concerning this basic condition for the creation of independent Algeria. This hesitation is unnecessarily postponing the bold decision which France will have to make some day, for it is more obvious than ever that no realistic solution can be reached unless the rights of the Algerian people to an independent life within the framework of their national and territorial unity is recognized.

There exists no basis, ethnic or geographical or historical — on which France can lay any claim to the Sahara. Such pretensions are opposed to the policy of decolonization proclaimed by de Gaulle. Negotiations about French investments in Sahara, about the exploitation of its enormous riches, and about France's economic interests in this part of Africa, are unavoidable, but these are questions of future bilateral relations between France and free Algeria. The provisional Algerian government has repeatedly stressed that it realizes the need for such negotiations, but on condition that its right to the integrity of the national territory should be previously recognized, without restrictions. Nor only would such an act by France and this tragic drama, which is drawing her into increasingly grave crisis and compromising her in the United Nations and in the eyes of the world public, but it would open the door for fruitful co-

operation with independent Algeria in the interests of the peoples of both countries.

De Gaulle's hesitation to start negotiations with the Provisional Algerian Government on this basis, which is the only acceptable one, is forcing France through narrow and dangerous straits. This has already begun to provoke undesirable manifestations in the political life of the country, and a sharp polarization of forces, which shows that the cadre of senior officers in the army who were educated for twenty years of colonial warfare has been transformed into a powerful reactionary machine which endangers democratic institutions, and threatens a new coup d'état and the introduction of fascism into the country.

It makes not only the peaceful solution of the Algerian war problematical, but also the destiny of French democracy. All the evils of a political system which cannot gather strength for a decisive break with the colonial past, and thus put an end to uncertainty, are again emerging to the surface.

We believe that President de Gaulle has sufficient authority and sufficient support from the nation to take this inevitable step, which is the essential condition for the recovery and re-confirmation of the influence and role of France in European and world affairs.

N. O.

ATTITUDE OF THE BLOCS

The Belgrade Conference and the World Press

By M. MARKOVIC

THE world press showed great interest in the Belgrade Conference of the Heads of State or Government of non-aligned countries, not only when it was being prepared but also when it was being held, and after its conclusion. In view of the marked and lasting influence of this Conference on international political life it can be expected that the world press will refer to it for a long time to come.

This great interest is due, first of all, to the fact that the world public is aware of the blind alley into which it has been led, and of the necessity of finding new ways for the settlement of urgent world problems. There was every reason to anticipate that the Conference would analyze these problems and indicate ways for their proper solution, in the interests of peace and the security of mankind, far more objectively than those who are directly concerned with the conflict of the big powers, or actually engaged in it. This great interest was also stimulated by the efforts of both blocs to utilize the Conference to reinforce their own bloc positions.

The bloc attitude towards the Conference created a platform on which the extremists from both blocs found themselves in the same position. Thus it is not surprising that the most reactionary papers of the Western press and the press of certain camp countries, primarily Albania and China, should have found common cause in attacking and falsifying the postulates of the Conference and of its participants.

On the whole, the Conference was given wide publicity in the press, radio and television of the West. The most marked bloc attitude, with variations in its method of treating certain questions, was shown in the press of the leading Western countries. Its attention was centred on the view taken by the non-aligned countries of the peace treaty with Germany and during the Conference, on their stand on the Soviet decision to resume nuclear tests.

Up to the Cairo meeting and even for some time after it, the USA press did not pay much attention to the Conference, underrating its importance, intention and influence.

However, the course of events, which had led to a strained international situation, aggravated by

the Berlin crisis, brought about change in its attitude.

The result was a sudden increase in the number of comments and guesses as to the views of the Conference countries on certain questions. At the same time efforts were made to influence these countries by suggesting what stand they should take, and by trying to exert pressure on them. It was pointed out then, though not so often as after the Conference, that the countries participating in it should bear in mind, when taking their stand and making their decisions, that many of them were beneficiaries of American aid.

Most of the papers of Great Britain, West Germany, and France, as well as of some other countries, commented unfavourably on the Conference. It should be, however, emphasized that the West German Press was more flexible and objective than the American in making comments on the closing statements of the Conference.

The realistic and objective comments in the Italian press deserve special attention. The Conference was treated in a similar way by the liberal and workers' press of the Scandinavian and some other West European countries.

After having first shown great interest in the Conference and commented favourably on it, the Latin American press changed its tone while it was being held, and after it. The policy of the non-aligned countries was attacked as an instrument for "Soviet imperialism", which was said to be trying to achieve world domination through this policy.

The camp press, though looking on the Conference from its own bloc position, assessed its importance and role in international political life in a more positive way.

The East European press did not inform its readers about the preparations for the Conference, nor did it show great interest in it until the eve of its opening. There were some comments, mainly in the Soviet and Polish press which, while hoping for a constructive outcome of the conference, stressed more or less openly that constructive results could be expected only if the Conference took a "correct" stand on the acute international problems of West

Berlin, general and complete disarmament etc. When speaking a "correct" stand it had in mind its own way of looking on these problems.

In contrast with its reserve when the Conference was in preparation, the press of the Eastern bloc gave wide publicity to its work and the statements issued by it. But it should be stressed that the camp press did not accept or judge the Conference uniformly either. Generally speaking, this press emphasized the stand of the Conference countries and the passages in its closing statements which resembled them, but passed over in silence or minimized other view points. Thus the declaration and the appeal of the Conference were given wide publicity, but the passages dealing with blocs and the solution of world problems from the position of force and those dealing with the role of non-aligned countries were ignored.

These passages, however, constitute an integral part of non-aligned concepts.

Although it does not deserve attention since it is no novelty, we may mention the markedly tendentious attitude of the Chinese and Albanian press toward Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav role at the Conference and, consequently, towards the whole idea of non-alignment and active and peaceful co-existence. By choosing for its attacks certain countries that attended the Conference, this press is

trying to break the unity of the non-aligned countries by methods of pressure and bullying.

The methods of the Chinese and Albanian press have their adherents in the West. An attempt was made also from this side to provoke a split between the non-aligned countries, with a view to preventing, or, at least, checking, the spread of the idea of non-alignment with blocs.

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The Conference was most constructively and exhaustively commented on in the press of the participating countries. This refers particularly to the Arabian, West African and Indonesian press.

The press of these countries was the faithful interpreter of the policy, importance and role of the non-aligned countries, refuting tendentious allegations of the creation of a "third bloc"; while it was objective in pointing out the constructive influence of the Conference and the policy of non-alignment, not only on the mutual relations of such countries, but on international relations in general.

The time which has elapsed since the end of the Conference has already shown that this influence is lasting and profound.

ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

DEVIATION FROM THE RIGHT TASKS

On the Eve of the Eleventh FAO Conference

By M. HUBENI

At this year's Conference of the UN organization for food and agriculture (FAO) the debate on the methods for the performance of tasks with which the United Nations have recently charged it will be predominant. At last year's session of the UNO General Assembly a resolution was adopted asking FAO to work out a procedure by which, with the help of the United Nations, the largest possible food surpluses would be made available on mutually favourable terms, as a temporary measure against starvation.

FAO was also asked to investigate what supplementary arrangements would be workable and acceptable, including multilateral arrangements under its sponsorship, with the aim of mobilizing the available food surpluses and distributing them to areas in the greatest need.

From this it may be inferred that the campaign against hunger launched by FAO two years ago is being given a material basis to fight it more effectively or, in other words, to contribute to economic progress in underdeveloped countries by a determined

policy concerning the distribution of agricultural surplus products, this being the surest method to eliminate hunger. Among other proposals, the United States has suggested the setting up of a fund of 100 million dollars in cash and goods in order to secure multilateral utilization of agricultural surpluses, and thus enlarge the bilateral arrangements already concluded. In this case FAO would be faced with the responsible task of participating in an adequate manner in the action to mitigate differences in level of development in various parts of the world. This task is all the more important in view of the fact that at this year's Conference FAO will certainly admit to its membership a score of new countries that have achieved political independence only recently, and are thus greatly interested in advancing their own economic development.

AGRICULTURAL SURPLUSES AND THE UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES

In a world where more than half the inhabitants are undernourished, agricultural surpluses play an important role in the economic development of countries where agricultural production is insufficient to cover their increased needs. Up to now aid has been given through bilateral channels only from the USA, where symptoms of agricultural over-production were most manifest. Today, however, agricultural over-production is no longer restricted to the United States, but is making itself felt in the intensive and subsidized agriculture of Western Europe, as well as in certain underdeveloped countries. This accounts for the growing pressure on the United States to submit to "discipline" so that its policy for disposing of its agricultural surpluses may no longer endanger agricultural exports from other countries. Until now, USA has been the only country to supply other countries with large stocks of agricultural surplus on special terms. Since 1954/55 the value of these deliveries has increased from 866 million dollars yearly to nearly 2 milliard. Consequently they constitute a considerable part of the aid rendered by the USA to a number of underdeveloped countries under bilateral arrangements. At the same time a great deal of the American export of agricultural products consists of surplus stocks, so that last year exports of such stocks accounted for 30 per cent of the total value of agricultural produce exported from the USA. Deliveries of agricultural surpluses on special terms have grown into an important factor in promoting both the export of American farm products and the economic development in the countries receiving them. The funds created from the sales of these surplus stocks are utilized, under, special agreements with the United States, to advance economic development in the countries which purchase them. Consequently, deliveries of agricultural surplus stocks exert an anti-inflationary influence in the beneficiary countries, while the funds from the sales of these surplus stocks create considerable investment funds which need not be earmarked from domestic accumulation.

In the present world situation in agriculture there are no prospects for the liquidation of agricultural surpluses in the near future. On the contrary, according to the group of experts who, at FAO's request, have analyzed the problem of how to utilize such surpluses for economic development, American agricultural surplus stocks amounting to the value of about 2.5 milliard dollars yearly will be available in the coming five years. Thus the utilization of agricultural surplus stocks is becoming a constant factor in the policy of aid to underdeveloped countries. It is estimated that aid in this form may amount to from 1/5 to 1/4 of the total aid to underdeveloped countries. Deliveries of agricultural surplus stocks on so large a scale would mean that total to underdeveloped countries would be increased to five or even seven milliard dollars yearly.

The great importance attached to agricultural surpluses in the policy of aid to underdeveloped countries raises several problems. One of them is that certain countries which export agricultural products feel endangered by the predominantly American deliveries of agricultural surpluses on special terms. These have succeeded in inducing FAO to set up principles to guide the distribution of agricultural surplus, the basic one being that surplus deliveries must not disturb traditional channels for agricultural products in world trade. Now these countries are insisting that deliveries

of agricultural surpluses should be more strictly regulated. But this question entails others: Are the underdeveloped countries able to utilize this aid effectively? Is it not necessary to take measures to make agricultural surplus stocks an efficacious instrument to promote economic development? In other words, is FAO the most suitable international organization to cope with these problems if mass deliveries of agricultural surplus stocks are to be made? Is it not a too strictly specialized agency to deal with problems of economic development? Is it a sufficiently universal organization (except for Poland and Yugoslavia, no socialist countries participate in its work) to guarantee that the policy of the utilization of surplus stocks for development will be conducted with real efficiency? Can FAO offer, in spite of its lack in universality, a guarantee that in the implementation of this policy it will not become an instrument in the ideological struggle between the world blocs? All these questions are expected to be answered at this year's conference.

CONTRARY TO FACTS

That there is a real danger of FAO's being turned into a tool in the present ideological struggle between the two blocs is shown by the manner in which this year's report on "the situation of food consumption and agriculture" in the world, treats agrarian reform in general, and agrarian reform in Yugoslavia in particular. The conception of reform includes all the economic and political measures by which certain changes in the structure of agriculture are brought about. Thus agrarian reform has lost its specific character, since it primarily implies radical and — to a certain extent — even revolutionary measures for changing the ownership relations in agriculture. But this conception of agrarian reform has a defined meaning. In the world of today backward ownership relations have been retained in various forms in many countries, but unless these relations are abolished there can be no progressive agriculture in such places. This is why the demand for agrarian reform has become a universal demand of progressive mankind and found a place among UNO's activities as well as in some of its agencies. But agrarian reform is being carried into effect today in conditions when capitalist relations, and even socialist relations in some countries, have already developed in other economic branches. This fact has a bearing on agrarian reform, and provides it with specific features it did not have before, that is to say, when such reform was made at an earlier stage. It is this circumstance that renders it possible, once agrarian reform has been implemented, to shift the development of agriculture in a determined direction, which need not necessarily be characterized by capitalist social relations. It is up to the social forces in the country which have started agrarian reform to provide it with a determined social import. Consequently it is the sovereign right of every country to determine the course of its own social development, and no international agency is called upon to prescribe to any country the course to be followed.

In the part of this year's report where agrarian reform is dealt with, FAO, however, does not follow this principle, but pledges itself to some sort of "independent agriculture as a healthy feature of democratic social life, in which special attention will be paid to family farming." Another passage in the report says: "A state that accepts agrarian reform must

lead it through all stages until a democratic and progressive society of farmers is formed."

What "a democratic and progressive society of farms" means is not quite clear, although it may be supposed that FAO is pleading for such a type of agriculture as exists in developed capitalist countries. The author of this part of the report is not in the least disturbed by the fact that more than one third of mankind has taken another, socialist, course and that, according to the statistics published in the report, agricultural production in these countries has shown a far higher rate of growth than in any other parts of the world. While the total world production of agricultural articles showed an increase of 17 per cent in 1960/61 as against the average in the period 1952/53-1956/57, the rate of increase was 30 per cent in Eastern Europe and in the U.S.S.R. In all other countries this rate is much lower, and in Western Europe it comes to only half the increase achieved in the socialist countries. If we take the movement of agricultural production as the criterium, the statistics published by FAO show that the methods for solving the agrarian problem in the East European countries and the U.S.S.R. need not inevitably impair the development of agriculture.

FAO's tendentious account of Yugoslav agriculture shows, however, a preconceived attitude towards the socialist solution for the furtherance of agricultural production. This is especially manifest in the survey of Yugoslavia's agrarian reform and agricultural policy. Not only is the survey itself tendentious, but it contains several misstatements, which shows that FAO has joined those few centres in the world from which misinformation about the conditions and the policy of Yugoslavia is being spread.

First of all, the origin of the agrarian pool is described inaccurately. The German national minority did not leave Yugoslavia after the war on account of agrarian reform, but because of their collaboration with the German and other occupying powers in the countries of Yugoslavia.

The second misstatement is that the peasant working cooperatives, after reorganization, became the refuge of poor and inefficient workers. The data show the reverse: the yields from the land of the peasant working cooperatives are considerably higher than those from the land of isolated peasants.

The third inaccurate statement is that the Law on the Agrotechnical Minimum was introduced to coerce the private owners into subordinating their agricultural production to the objectives of the plan, so that "the private element in agriculture is working with great difficulty."

IN THE WAKE OF EVENTS

FAO is preparing to tackle the solution of major world problems which are beyond the scope of measures for promoting agricultural production throughout the world. It is preparing to engage in the canalization of agricultural surplus stocks to be distributed for the development of underdeveloped countries. Having launched an action for the furtherance of the economies of the Mediterranean countries, FAO started a world campaign against hunger two years ago. Thus two large-scale world campaigns are linked with one another, which makes it difficult to obtain a true picture of the phases or results of these actions. It seems that this has become the system of work of this big international organization. In view of its being engaged in these extensive world actions, it is not surprising that FAO should not manage to deal with every concrete question, or that it should find

itself, as far as the solution of these questions is concerned, lagging behind.

The following examples may serve to illustrate this:

The problems of agrarian subsidizing and the regulation of the agricultural market of the European Economic Community are of great interest to many countries in all parts of the world. But the repercussions of these measures on the level and trend of agricultural trade do not appear to concern FAO. The report refers only to the measures which have been undertaken, but there is no analysis of their repercussions on world agricultural trade. Moreover, within the framework of UNO a campaign in connection with so-called compensation financing has been started, with a view to weakening by appropriate measures the effect of the fluctuation of prices of agricultural products on the export earnings of the countries that export them. This problem, too, is of paramount importance to the underdeveloped, predominantly agricultural countries. The formation of closed, autarkic groups of developed countries and the fluctuation of the prices of agricultural products have a direct bearing on the amount of export earnings of the underdeveloped countries, while these countries' funds for investment in their own agriculture depend on these earnings. But for FAO the problems of this interrelation are still untouched. FAO is not planning any concrete action, nor has it made any concrete proposal for the solution of these problems on an international basis.

It is difficult to forecast the attitude of the Conference towards these questions. But if it accepts the suggestions of the report, it will certainly force FAO into activities which are not within the scope of the task set when it was founded.

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COMMON MARKET AND INDEPENDENT COUNTRIES OF AFRICA

By Zdenko RAJH

THE PRINCIPLES of the present policy of the six countries of the Common Market — France, West Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, Holland and Italy — towards the independent countries of Africa were laid down in the Rome Treaties in 1957, that is to say at a time when the latter were still under colonial rule. Actually, through the Common Market policy the six West European countries, already closely interconnected by instruments of economic integration, decided to co-ordinate their policies in respect of their colonial possessions, too. This co-ordination was conceived to take place through the association of these territories with the Common Market. Its primary objective was to link all the countries of the European Economic Community (EEC) with their colonies: the rendering of economic aid and various other measures, predominantly in the field of foreign trade. By this co-ordination the EEC would be afforded an opportunity of expansion in the direction of these colonies, and by the application of the instruments designated in the Rome Treaties the privileges of the metropolises were to have been gradually extended to the other countries of the Common Market.

The political aim of this project, propounded in the phase of the decay of the colonial system, was to induce the representatives of certain classes in the former colonial countries to maintain neo-colonial relations by encouraging them to establish such relations through economic aid and other facilities, not only from their own metropolises but also from other highly industrialized countries. At the same time the industrialized EEC countries would be able to participate jointly in the exploitation of underdeveloped territories.

But with the gradual liquidation of colonial relations on the African continent, the clauses of the Rome Treaties lost their validity for most of the African countries which have now achieved independence, since these clauses were adopted without their participation. But the policy of the Common Market has found a new, though more restricted field of action. This may be explained by the fact that, in the unsettled and unusual situation which arose after the achievement of independence especially in some of the former French colonies, the representatives of those political forces whose foreign political dealings were still influenced by the long inheritance of their colonial past have come to power. The same reasons which have induced certain French colonies to ally themselves with their metropolis within the framework of the French Community have induced them to join the Common Market. The fourteen countries of the French Community, the former Italian Somaliland, and the "government" in Leopoldville, have joined the Common Market under the Joining Agreement, whose validity expires at the end of 1962, and which constitutes an addendum and an integral part of the Rome Treaties.

Given the dynamic development of events in Africa itself — the establishment of mutual ties, regional unification, the joint actions of a number of African countries along the lines of anti-colonialism — the question of close connections between certain countries of the French Community and their former metropolis, as well as their relations with the Common Market, is becoming a problem. In this respect the attitude of the Republic of Mali, along with Ghana, Guinea, Upper Volta and Dahomey etc., which are exerting a growing influence within the French Community, is of great importance.

This is why the leading organs of the Common Market have recently been endeavouring to adapt their policy towards the independent African countries to the newly-created situation, at least declaratively. The statement made by Professor Hallstein, President of the Commission of the Common Market, that the Rome Agreements are politically outmoded as regards the African countries, should be interpreted in this light. On the initiative of the Commission of the Common Market and the European Parliament, a joint conference, attended by 103 African and 142 European delegates, was held in Strasbourg from June 19 to June 24, 1961. The Commission put forward a plan by which the relations between the Common Market and the African countries fixed by the Rome Treaties for a period of five years should now remain effective for an unlimited period.

It is clear that in view of the process of rapid political maturing in Africa, including the countries of the French Community, such an idea is more than absurd, and in any case, the basic economic and political principles underlying the new agreement are virtually the same as in the Rome Treaties. The only difference is that in view of the development of relations between the metropolis and the countries of the French Community, which have been becoming slacker in recent times, the Common Market tends to take over the economic role of the metropolis, and is endeavouring to keep these countries, through a suitable preferential system of foreign trade and increased economic aid, within the sphere of influence of the Western Alliance.

The central problem, which was the subject of many discussions at the Strasbourg Conference — officially called "the Euro-Asian Conference" — was, in fact, that of trade policy in general, and of the position of the African countries in connection with the process of joining the Common Market, in particular.

These two questions are closely inter-related. The Rome Treaties stipulated that the colonial countries should be induced to join the Common Market through a gradually widened system of preferential treatment, which the countries of the French Community had been enjoying on the markets of the metropolis, since their exports to the French market were exempt from duty. The Rome Treaties demanded that the countries

of the Common Market, in their relations with the then colonies, should pursue the same customs-policy and the same policy of liberalization they were following in their own mutual trade. As this policy was leading to the gradual abolition of duties and quantitative restrictions, the same system should apply to the exports from the associated countries of Africa to the countries of the Common Market, so that the economies of these African countries should be linked still more closely with the markets of all the six countries of the European Economic Community. At the same time, in the final phase of this association, the position of all six countries of the Common Market should, from the point of view of foreign trade, be the same in every respect as that of the former metropolis.

As regards their exports to Africa, the countries of the Common Market are ready to compromise. They are aware that the underdeveloped countries would refuse to throw open their markets to goods from the highly developed EEC countries without import duties, the more so as these duties represent an important source of income in their budgets. This was actually foreseen in the Rome Treaties, at the time when this question affected the interest of the metropolises. Because of this, and the wide opportunities for compensation in other sectors, the countries of the Common Market are prepared to allow the underdeveloped African countries to protect themselves through their customs-policies, to a certain extent and within determined limits, against strong pressure from the highly developed countries on their internal markets.

This foreign trade system has already been put into practice in part — by virtue of the Agreement on Association, and the respective clauses of the Rome Treaties — although the preferential treatment of these African countries on the Common Market is still modest. It is not, however, a question of how matters stand now, but how they will develop through the process of European integration, which will undoubtedly stimulate the expansion of the preferential system. A considerable number of African delegates at the Strasbourg Conference demanded that when the new agreement takes effect the preferential treatment applied on the French Market should be extended to all countries of the Common Market.

Viewed from the aspect of the narrow and short-term interests of these independent countries concerning the preferential treatment of their exports to the principal markets of continental Western Europe, the attitude of these African delegates at the Strasbourg Conference is comprehensible to a certain extent. They are trying to derive the greatest benefit for themselves from their relations with the Common Market. But they are deluding themselves if they expect that the Common Market, in taking over the economic role of the metropolis, will establish relations which are more acceptable to them than those they had maintained with their own metropolises, or that the influence of the Common Market on their economies will lead to a speeded-up development of their economies.

As regards the interests of these African countries in the long run, i. e., their economic development, the problem of their relations appears in quite a different light. On this plane, the economic policy of the Common Market will have far-reaching economic and political consequences. It is from the aspect of foreign trade instruments or, to be more accurate, through the system of preferences that the countries

of the Common Market can influence, by the sporadic operations of their wide markets, the course of development of these underdeveloped African countries far more strongly than the metropolises were able to do, and at the same time separate them from the rest of the African countries, which are reluctant or unable to join the Common Market.

Thus, as far as customs-policy and other treatment on the markets of the six West European countries are concerned, two Africas are in the making: one associated and therefore entitled to claim the benefits of association, and the other discriminated against and in an unfavourable position in competition on the Common Market. Another important feature is that all African countries, whether associated with the Common Market or not, bring more or less the same products to the foreign markets, so that the policy of the expansion of the Common Market towards Africa means the breaking up of the unity of the African economic area.

But it would be a mistake to presume that the influence of the Common Market on the economies of the associated countries will eventually lead to constructive results. With the growth of supply and demand in its member countries, it will stimulate — at least in periods of great economic prosperity — the increase of exports from its associated African countries. But at the same time it will have a bearing on the increase of their raw material production and exeth a view on their backward economic systems, with a view to inducing these countries to supply it with still greater quantities than before of those raw materials which are in the greatest demand in the countries of the Common Market.

In other words, the pressure of the Common Market on these underdeveloped countries cannot but result in directing their production towards the strengthening of their raw material structure, and thus towards monoculture. But with the first wave of a serious economic recession or crisis in Western Europe this system is liable to hit underdeveloped economies and the standard of living in such countries, which is low enough as it is. For the African countries which have achieved political independence the economic system of the Common Market is, in fact, a trap, which, while keeping them in colonial relations, acts by fits and starts as a brake on the prospects of their future economic growth.

It is even questionable whether this system will serve their interests in the immediate future. If the system of preferential treatment in trade results in the increase of their exports to the Common Market, the rest of the African countries, which are not associated with the Common Market, but which export the same articles — cacaobeans, coffee, oilseed, bananas, copra etc. — to foreign markets, will be compelled to seek a way out of their unfavourable situation through increasing their exports to other world markets. Thus the increased production of these articles in the countries associated with the Common Market and the simultaneously increased offering of the same articles to various other markets by the rest of African countries, on less favourable terms than before, will inevitably lead to the decline of world prices for these raw materials and tropical products. This will shift the relation of exchange in favour of the industrially advanced countries.

Finally the advanced countries will profit by the system of preferential treatment that they are allegedly granting to the underdeveloped countries "for the

purpose of promoting their economic and social development", as stated in the Rome Treaty.

Thus the basic economic contradiction between the interests of the underdeveloped countries of Africa and those of the capitalist countries of the Common Market constitutes the lasting basis of their future relations, as well as the motive power which impels an increasing number of African countries to independent action for their regional unification and their political recognition on the international plane. This contradiction was manifested at the Conference in Strassbourg. While the majority of the African parliamentarians demanded the establishing of co-operation between their own Common Market countries and the other African countries, within the framework of the respective marketing organs, the majority of the attending delegates imposed on the Conference a resolution which prevents the African countries "which

belong to another economic group whose interests are incompatible with those of the association" from joining the Common Market.

This resolution, which was aimed at excluding the African countries from any association with the Common Market, has a far wider political bearing. It shows a tendency to separate the African economic area which is expected to join the Common Market, from the other African countries whose political attitude, like that of the other uncommitted countries of the world, is one of the most important elements in the present struggle for new and more equitable international economic and political relations. Thus, the attitude of the Common Market towards Africa shows elements of bloc policy, which constitute important components of its expansion in the direction of Africa.

YUGOSLAVIA TODAY

COOPERATION WITH UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES IN MARITIME ECONOMY

By Branko KOJIC

WITH the political liberation of a large number of countries in Asia and Africa, these countries had to face the problem of their insufficiently developed economies and backwardness in which they had been kept by their former colonial masters. On the road of their development, the underdeveloped overseas countries must among other things, also make efforts to promote their maritime economies. Many of these countries, although maritime States, have no merchant marines of their own, not even developed harbours; even if they have some ports, they are so badly located and so poorly equipped that they are quite unable to meet the requirements of the respective economies. These few harbours were built by the former colonial Powers, not for the needs of these countries, but to meet their economic, i. e. strategic interests.

The difficulties of these countries in developing their maritime economies appear to be all the greater when we consider that almost all newly-liberated maritime States in Asia and Africa are necessarily forced to rely on foreign financial and technical assistance. This matter is likewise of particular importance because most of these underdeveloped countries refuse to accept assistance which is granted on military or political conditions, or, which would bind them to any foreign Power or bloc of powers.

In the past, too, many small maritime countries seeking to secure funds for their economic development, have been finding a way out of numerous difficulties by developing of their maritime economies. It will suffice to mention Norway and Greece, the most characteristic examples. Norway, which has only three and a half million inhabitants, has a merchant marine of 1,550 ships, totalling more than 11,000,000 GRT, which brings her an annual

income of about 400,000,000 dollars in foreign currency. The merchant marine of Greece has now been increased to nearly six million GRT, mainly because a large number of Greek shipowners, whose vessels used to sail under foreign flags, have re-registered their ships in Greek ports.

It is consequently easy to understand how important the development of the maritime economy is for a country such as Indonesia, the large archipelago State, with more than 3,000 bigger and smaller islands, scattered over the Indian and Pacific Oceans, intersecting the shipping routes to China, Japan, the Philippines, Australia and New-Zealand. The total area of these islands is 1,5 million square kilometres, and the country's national merchant marine has only 177 ships, amounting to 2,406 GRT (reckoning only ships over 300 tons), which is too little to satisfy the internal shipping needs, to say nothing about the necessary shipping services with the outer world. India, another large country, has only 166 ships, with 840,000 GRT, and that is just a little more than what Yugoslavia has.

The newly-established States in Africa are already taking steps to build up their own merchant fleets, so as to be able to promote their seaborne trade with their own ships and create another field of employment for their people.

Many of these States bear in mind the example of Israel, whose merchant fleet, in 1948, consisted of only 5 ships with 10,000 GRT, whereas, in April this year, this fleet had 54 ships with a total tonnage of 320,000. These ships are increasingly being used as trampers, which helps to balance the country's foreign payments. According to plan, the Israeli merchant marine will be increased to 1,000,000 GRT in the next ten-year period, and the

earnings which the fleet will then make are expected to reach about 50,000,000 dollars.

The appearance of underdeveloped countries in the world maritime economy will greatly affect international seaborne trade, both in passenger and cargo traffic. This will, in the future, necessarily cause changes in the present composition and distribution of the merchant fleets in the world.

Of the 125,000,000 GRT, which is the total tonnage of merchant ships in the world, 109,000,000 GRT belong to the countries of Europe and North America, including the large Liberian fleet (11,000,000 GRT) which is largely in the hands of American and European shipowners. In contrast to this, all other countries of Asia, Africa, South America, Australia and New Zealand, which constitute most of the world population, have only 9,000,000 GRT of shipping, i. e. less than Norway alone (excluding Japan which has a fleet of 7,000,000 GRT).

The efforts of the new maritime States cannot harm the interests of the countries with developed merchant marines, because world trade and, consequently, the world seaborne traffic, are constantly growing. From 1947 to 1960, for instance, the volume of world trade has doubled, and this led to an increase in the merchant fleets from 66,000,000 to 120,000,000 GRT. The constantly growing world population, the overcoming of the economic backwardness of the underdeveloped countries, and general scientific and technological advances, will result in a still greater increases in world trade, which will necessitate an even larger merchant marine. It is only natural that the new maritime countries should have a share in this increase.

Just as this road was followed by the liberated countries in Eastern Asia and then by countries in North Africa as well (the United Arab Republic now has 50 ships with 200,000 GRT, and Morocco 20 ships) the newly liberated countries in Western Africa are endeavouring to organize their own merchant fleets.

Ghana was the first State in Western Africa which, in 1957, i. e. in the first year of her independence, founded the first national West African shipping company ("Black Star Line"). This company now has three motor ships totalling 22,000 DWT, as well as two chartered ships, with which it maintains regular services between Western Africa and Britain. Under the Second Five-Year Plan of Ghana's Economic Development, considerable sums will be invested in the purchase of new ships.

Following Ghana's example, Nigeria, too, has founded her own shipping enterprise which is co-operating with some British lines. The Mali Republic is now negotiating purchases of ships under longterm credit arrangements, and the Cameroons is studying the possibility of starting a national shipping company.

Another important programme of the underdeveloped maritime States in Africa is the construction of harbours. Here, too, we must emphasize the example of Ghana, where the large harbour of Tema is being completed and in which eight berths will be put into operation by the end of this year. Similar problems in regard to harbours must also be solved by Liberia, Guinea, Togo, Sierra Leone, the Ivory Coast and other young maritime countries of Asia and Africa.

II

YUGOSLAVIA is successfully co-operating with the liberated countries in Asia and Africa, both in general economic affairs and in the development of their maritime economies. Owing to her industrial expansion, Yugoslavia is in a position to extend considerable assistance to these countries, and she is endeavouring to adjust, as much as possible, her production to the needs and specific conditions of every one of these countries. Yugoslavia's economic co-operation with these countries

comprises, not only regular trade, but also scientific, technical and other forms of assistance, including aid in industrial designing, town planning, geological exploration, land charting, maintenance and sounding operations, as well as in the participation of Yugoslav enterprises and specialists in the construction of various industrial projects, and in the training of technical and other personnel. All this helps to promote and strengthen mutual economic and friendly relations and to accelerate the economic development of these countries.

Of the West African countries, the greatest progress has been made in co-operation with Ghana, Guinea and Liberia, with whom the volume of trade has increased by 31 percent from 1959 to 1960. The recent visits paid by President Tito to Ghana, Togo, Liberia, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, Tunisia and the United Arab Republic greatly expanded mutual bonds of friendship with these countries, and helped establish a broader basis for economic co-operation in the future.

So far, Yugoslav industrial enterprises have been exporting their products to forty-four countries in Africa, the Near East, South-East Asia and Oceania. From year to year, trade with these areas has been increasing, both in volume and structure. At present, Yugoslavia is in a position to offer to her trading partners in these parts of the world a large variety of products, beginning from equipment for heavy industries and power generating to all kinds of consumer goods.

At the same time, Yugoslavia is endeavouring to increase her imports from these countries, not only of raw materials, but also of other products, for which these countries are seeking new markets, thus contributing to the increase in the consumption of these articles.

Ships of Yugoslav navigation enterprises are maintaining increasingly frequent contacts with the underdeveloped overseas countries. Following "Jugolinija", whose ships are maintaining regular services with South America, the Levantine countries, Iraq, Iran, India, Pakistan, Burma, Indonesia, all the way to China and Japan, other shipping enterprises, too, are strengthening services between Yugoslavia and these countries. In 1959, the "Brodospas" Enterprise of Split established a service maintained by three ships between Yugoslavia and Western Africa, transporting various goods exported to and imported from that area, and, in November 1960, "Jugoslovenska Oceanska Plovidba" of Kotor started a regular service with the Caribbean countries and the neighbouring areas in Latin America.

Lately, increasing importance in being attached to Yugoslavia's co-operation with the underdeveloped countries in the field of maritime economy. As a traditional maritime country, Yugoslavia is in a position to help the newly-established States in Africa and Asia in developing their merchant marines and in the construction of ports. In this field, Yugoslav enterprises have gained useful experience.

The "Pomgrad" Enterprise of Split, which successfully built the Syrian port of Latakia, is now enlarging and reconstructing the Ethiopian port of Assab, the largest and most important project provided for by the current Five-Year Plan of Ethiopia's Economic Development. Since the beginning of 1958, this harbour building enterprise has built seven hundred and fifty metres of breakwaters, two 1,040-metre quays, a 1,200-metre long waterfront, and harbour warehouses with 24,000 square metres of flor space. The port of Assab will be one of the largest and best-equipped harbours in the Red Sea, and will be able to simultaneously service six large ocean-going ships. The capacity of the harbour will be from 600,000 to 700,000 tons of goods per annum.

A large part of the material for this harbour has been sent from Yugoslavia; manpower is exclusively supplied by Ethiopia, while Yugoslavs are employed as technical personnel.

This port will be of great significance for the future economic development of Ethiopia. Assab is 660 kilometres from Addis Ababa, which is not only the capital of the country, but also the most important economic centre of Ethiopia, while the port of Massau is 1,300 kilometres from the capital. Apart from this, the road from Massau to Addis Ababa passes over mountain ranges, some of which are 3,000 metres high, which greatly increase transport costs. With the construction of the harbour of Assab, Addis Ababa will have a much nearer outlet to the sea. Work on this harbour will be completed by the end of this year, although it had been planned to last until the 15th of February, 1962.

The "Pomgrad" Enterprise of Split was recently engaged to build the port of Tartous in the Syrian Province of the United Arab Republic. The largest project in this harbour will be a 2,700-metre long opensea breakwater, so that the port of Tartous will have the longest breakwater in the Mediterranean. In addition to this, the port will have a subsidiary breakwater 1,560 metres long and a 600-metres-long waterfront. Work on this harbour began on April 1, 1960, and is to be completed by 1965.

The expansion of the Yugoslav shipbuilding industry makes it possible to promote Yugoslavia's co-operation with the overseas countries. At present, Yugoslavia has 4 large, 16 medium-size, and 40 small shipyards, whose capacity amounts to nearly 300,000 tons of shipping, two thirds of which can be exported to foreign countries. So far, these shipyards have built vessels for shipowners in Switzerland, Greece, Brazil, the United States, Great Britain, the United Arab Republic, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Czechoslovakia, Pakistan, Bulgaria, Burma, the Sudan, Panama, Poland, India and Indonesia. The largest Yugoslav shipyards are now building not only ships, but also ship engines under licences of wellknown foreign firms.

Although ships of various types and classes are gaining in importance on the list of Yugoslav exports to the underdeveloped countries, there are possibilities of still greater co-operation in this field.

On April 12, 1960, the Yugoslav Government signed an agreement with the Sudanese Government on the founding of a Mixed Sudanese-Yugoslav Shipping Company with its head office in Port Sudan, undertaking to supply this company with the necessary personnel. Towards the end of 1960,

this company ordered from the "Ulianik" Shipyards of Pula two 4,800-ton ships with 5,540 HP engines. In addition to this, the Sudanese Government at the same time signed a contract with the "Jozo Lozovina-Mosor" Shipyard of Trogir for the construction of four up-to-date patrol boats.

The "Ulianik" Shipyards have built a 12,400-ton cargo boat for the Indian merchant marine.

The Shipyards in Kraljevica, Piran, Trogir, Korčula and Beograd are building ten 940-ton ships for the Pelne Shipping Company of Djakarta; these ships are to be used in the internal Indonesian shipping services.

An agreement concluded with Guinea in October 1960 provides for the building of patrol boats, and, in May 1961, Tunisia ordered five fishing trawlers with up-to-date navigational instruments and equipment for the preservation of fish.

In the "3 Maj" Shipyards of Rijeka, a modern 10,500-ton liner was launched at the beginning of April; this is the first of six ships of the same class being built for the "Flota Mercante del Estrado" of Buenos Aires. Three of these ships will be built by "3 Maj", and the other three by the "Split" Shipyards. These will be Yugoslavia's first deliveries of ships to the Latin American countries.

This is only a small section of the export list of the Yugoslav shipyards.

The port of Rijeka has become an important transit harbour for the countries of Central Europe. The advantage of Rijeka comes to particular expression in traffic between Europe and the Suez Canal zone, and the countries beyond, as this is the shortest and the cheapest route. The distance between Rijeka and Port Said is only 1,260 miles, while Port Said is 3,590 miles from Hamburg and 3,930 miles from Gdinya. A trip from Hamburg or Gdinya takes roughly ten days more than from Rijeka.

The Yugoslav harbours can successfully compete with the harbours in Western and Northern Europe in traffic with Western Africa and Southern America, since the distances are, more or less, the same.

Accordingly, there is every prospect that the Yugoslav ports will be increasingly used in trade between Central and East European countries, and a large number of overseas States. This is of special importance as the European countries are taking steps to expand their economic relations with the new States in Asia and Africa.

THE OLD POSITIONS

Socialist Yugoslavia in the Draft Programme of the Soviet Communist Party

THE Draft Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which is to be submitted to the 22nd Congress of the Party in October this year, was published in Moscow some time ago. As stated in the Draft, this is the programme of development of communism in the Soviet Union; while some, according to the Soviet press, have called it the 20th century communist manifesto.

The Draft Programme refers to all the more important problems concerning the international workers' movement and international relations, as well as the internal development of the Soviet Union. There are three passages in the Draft explicitly devoted to Yugoslavia, while she is referred to without actually being named, in several other sections in which the mentioned passages are explained in greater detail. In all these

sections, the well-known denunciations against Yugoslavia, while she is referred to without actually being either directly or indirectly, under the guise of the struggle against revisionism in the workers' movement.

We shall discuss only the sections of the Draft directly or indirectly concerning the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, or Yugoslavia herself, though — speaking from a Marxist standpoint — we could make a number of critical remarks on other statements of the Draft Programme. This Programme, it is true, contains a number of positive tenets, but there are several which could not stand up to scientific Marxist criticism. The appraisal of Yugoslavia and her socialist development belongs to the latter category.

THE DRAFT'S STATEMENTS ON YUGOSLAVIA

The first direct reference to Yugoslavia is made in the third chapter of the first section of Draft Programme. This chapter is entitled "The World Socialist System" and speaks of the socialist camp. After it has been said that the path of socialist development has been taken by the peoples of Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Vietnam, China, the German Democratic Republic, Korea, Rumania, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, and before them by the people of Mongolia — "who with the Soviet Union form the socialist camp" — there comes the following passage:

"The socialist path has also been taken by Yugoslavia. But by their revisionist policy, the Yugoslav leaders have placed Yugoslavia in opposition to the socialist camp and the international communist movement, and have created the danger that the Yugoslav people may lose their revolutionary achievements".

The Programme, after stating that there are a number of "principal laws" which are specific for all countries developing socialism (a "monotypical" economic basis, a "monotypical" social system, one ideology, a common interest in the protection of socialist achievements, one single aim — communism), comes to the conclusion that these laws make the linking of the socialist countries in a socialist camp an imperative need. Then comes the passage:

"The course of isolated development of socialism, separated from the world community of socialist countries, is untenable from the theoretical point of view because it is in contradiction with the objective laws of the development of a socialist society. It is detrimental from the economic point of view because it leads to squandering social work, reduces the rate of increase in production and brings the country into dependence on the capitalist world. It is reactionary and dangerous from the political point of view because it does not unite, but disunites nations in the face of the united front of the imperialist powers, stimulates bourgeois-nationalistic tendencies and can, in the long run, lead to the loss of the socialist achievements".

This last quotation is, in fact, a more exhaustive elaboration of the aforementioned theses.

This chapter ends by saying that nationalism is detrimental to the general interests of the socialist community, and primarily to the people of the country in which it is manifested, "since separation from the socialist camp obstructs its development, and deprives it of the opportunity of profiting by the advantages of the world socialist system".

In Chapter Five, which speaks of the international revolutionary movement of the working class, revisionism is said to be the principal danger in the communist movement in contemporary conditions:

"In contemporary conditions the principal danger in the communist movement is revisionism, or rightist opportunism, as a reflection of bourgeois influence. By concealing their deviation from Marxism by arguing about the necessity of taking into account the latest conditions of the development of society and the class struggle, the revisionists are actually playing the role of disseminators of the bourgeois-reformist ideology in the communist movement. They are endeavouring to suppress the revolutionary spirit of Marxism-Leninism, to undermine the faith of the working class and the working people in the cause of socialism, and to disarm and demobilize the workers and working people in their struggle against the imperialists. The revisionists deny the historic inevitability of the socialist revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat, as well as the leading role of the Marxist-Leninist party;

they are undermining the foundations of proletarian internationalism, and turning it towards nationalism. The ideology of revisionism has been reflected to the fullest measure in the Programme of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia".

Since, accordingly, all the sins which an unrelenting enemy of the working class can impute to socialism have thus been compiled in the Programme of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, the conclusion — stated a little further on — that an uncompromised struggle against revisionism is the condition for "the strengthening of the unity of the communist movement and the socialist camp" appears to be logical.

Let us try to summarize in brief the essence of the Draft's statements which, directly or indirectly, concern Yugoslavia:

1) The victory of socialism in a country is impossible unless that country is a member of the socialist camp.

2) Yugoslavia is threatened with the danger of the loss of her socialist achievements, because she has "isolated" herself from the socialist camp.

3) The Yugoslav course "of isolated development of socialism" is disuniting the peoples in the face of the imperialist front.

4) Revisionism, which is the danger for the communist movement and the socialist camp, has come to the fullest expression in Yugoslavia.

Obviously, the essence of the attack is not at all new. It will be easily recognized by every Yugoslav working man. It has been contained in all similar attacks against socialist Yugoslavia, from the first letters of Stalin and the Resolution of the Informbureau to the documents approved by the 21st Congress of the Soviet Communist Party and the Declaration of last year's consultation of communist parties in Moscow. We need only recall the following quotations from the Resolution of the Informbureau.

"The Information Bureau holds that this policy of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia threatens the very existence of the Communist Party and conceals in itself the danger of the ultimate degeneration of the Yugoslav People's Republic".

Or further:

"The Information Bureau has come to the unanimous conclusion that the leaders of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, with their anti-party and anti-Soviet views... are in opposition to the communist parties within the Information Bureau, that they have taken the path of secession from the united socialist front against imperialism, the path of treason of the cause of the international solidarity of the working people, and the path of adopting the positions of nationalism".

It is clear that the above statements are identical with those just quoted, both in language and in essence.

For the sake of truth it must be said that these statements of the Informbureau's Resolution were condemned in certain statements made at the time of the normalization of relations with Yugoslavia. They were even said to have been the work of agents of imperialism. But after Yugoslavia declined to sign the Declaration of Twelve Communist Parties in Moscow in 1957, the Resolution was rehabilitated, it being said to "have been basically correct and in accordance with the interests of the revolutionary movement". Today this spirit of the revived Resolution of the

Informbureau again appears on the pages of the Draft Programme of the Soviet Communist Party.

Let us refer separately to the basic tenets of the Draft relating to Yugoslavia.

THE SOCIAL CHARACTER OF YUGOSLAVIA

Yugoslavia, as can be seen, has not had the "good fortune" to be included in the alphabetical list of socialist countries. She was mentioned subsequently, merely as having also taken the path of socialism. Whether she is still following this path or whether she has deviated or is lagging behind, etc., is not explicitly stated in the text, though it is immediately added that "the revisionist leadership" is endangering the achievements of socialism in Yugoslavia. It is obvious that this manoeuvring space has been left for definite purposes. Although indefinite, the formulation that Yugoslavia has taken the socialist path goes to show that to cope with historical facts is hard, even for those who for definite reasons often consciously deny them; for the truth about the social system of Yugoslavia cannot be easily concealed before the international workers' movement and world public. But the authors of the Draft stop precisely at this indefinite formulation, though in all further sections they cast so many doubts on the present character of social relations in Yugoslavia that the impression gained is unambiguously of a country with some sort of revisionist and bourgeois-nationalistic system conspiring against all that is socialist in the world, or else of some kind of "socialism" which is on the brink of wreckage, and which is undermining its own roots. The purpose is to suggest the idea that the peoples of Yugoslavia fought for socialism, but very little of it remains today.

The Yugoslav leaders are said to have created the danger of the Yugoslav peoples losing their revolutionary achievements, because Yugoslavia is not a member of the "socialist camp". The old and demagogic tactics of separating the leadership from the people is again being applied, and attempts are being made to decide on and judge from outside the leadership of the Yugoslav people, on their behalf and, what is more, to do so in the name of people who for the last twenty years and more have been going through the battles of the socialist revolution and development with this same leadership. This, indeed, has nothing to do with ideological struggle or discussion, for it is obvious that it constitutes a most flagrant interference in the internal affairs of Yugoslavia and a perfidious attempt to legalize such practice in the name of socialism and "real" Marxism. It is this end, in fact, which is served by the vacant manoeuvring space, that ambiguity as to whether Yugoslavia is a socialist country or not.

So, as to make the false picture of Yugoslavia as complete as possible, Yugoslavia is not mentioned in any of the sections of the Draft which speak about the socialist world. This is the familiar conspiracy of silence which has been created round Yugoslavia, as if the reality in a country is dependent on whether certain people abroad speak about it or not. Indeed, for such "critics" of Yugoslavia the method of silence seems to be the only feasible one in relation to Yugoslavia. For it is obvious that it is impossible to tell the Yugoslav people, or any other people, that the people's authority, the workers' councils, the communes, the bodies of self-government, etc., developed on the basis of the socially-owned means of production and the consciousness of the working people under the leadership of the League of Com-

munist of Yugoslavia, are not socialist achievements, or an essential and decisive indicator of the social character of socialist Yugoslavia.

Yugoslav socialism remains unchanged regardless of whether some people abroad recognize it or not. In this respect, how certain people assess the social character of Yugoslavia is not important to us. But it is a different matter when definite practical political conclusions are drawn from this. For these conclusions are such as to allow others to attack Yugoslavia, and to withhold from the Yugoslav communists even the right to defence. In other words: while others not only feel no "international obligations" towards socialist Yugoslavia, but are even causing her many difficulties, a genuine crusade is being waged against the forms of socialist relations which are being developed in Yugoslavia, under the guise of declarations on the danger allegedly threatening socialism from "the Yugoslav leaders".

It is this faulty logic, however, that best proves that "something is rotten in the state of Denmark". In effect, the mere fact that someone should judge subjectively — from the political pedestal of the leading factor — which country is socialist and which is not, is so anti-Marxist as to make it instantly apparent that it is based on definite current political interest and not on science.

As a matter of fact, in this respect the appraisal of the Yugoslav social system is not the only weakness of the Draft Programme. Approaching this problem pragmatically, the Draft is fundamentally involved in untenable constructions concerning the appraisal of the social development in countries which have freed themselves from colonialism. This kind of assessment makes it possible for all social and political processes in the world to be measured by one subjectivist criterium of the needs of its own practice, allowing no one even the chance of introducing anything new into contemporary socialism or the social process in general. The political sense and consequences of such monopolistic tendencies are clear to everybody.

After the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party it appeared to us that the time had definitely passed when anyone could aspire — as Moša Pijade wrote — to the right to confer, as the Vatican once did, royal crowns in the form of recognizing or not recognizing socialism in a country. Unfortunately, it seems that we were mistaken.

THE "ISOLATED DEVELOPMENT" OF SOCIALISM

Stampa „Servis Saveza udruženja pravnika Jugoslavije"

The thesis on the untenability of the "course of isolated development of socialism" occupies a central place in the tenets of the Draft levelled against Yugoslavia. The others mainly serve to explain this central one in "greater detail". This thesis has a double purpose:

First, to ignore the independent path of socialist Yugoslavia, and

Second, to attempt to isolate Yugoslavia politically.

Let us review the purpose of this thesis in some detail.

First of all, the Yugoslav communists do not consider that they are following the course of isolated development of socialism. On the contrary, they consider that Yugoslavia is objectively — by its very existence and irrespective of anybody's will — part of the socialist world, and the Yugoslav communists are a unit of those socialist forces which are consistently

fighting for new relations among people and nations in the world. This is confirmed by history, and by the fact that Yugoslav communists are those who have been fighting persistently and consistently against all attempts, even very brutal ones, to isolate Yugoslavia in the recent past. It is well-known who carried out the economic blockade of Yugoslavia, and in what way, who broke off economic and other arrangements with Yugoslavia, and who attempted to isolate politically the Yugoslav communists i. e., the peoples of Yugoslavia.

Let us refer to the theoretical aspect of this question, although in this text it has a purely political purpose.

The thesis that the course of isolated (i. e. outside the camp) development of socialism is untenable from the theoretical point of view, cannot stand up to even the most superficial scientific criticism. The example of the Soviet Union itself shows that the development of socialism, even in entirely capitalist surroundings, is possible. The same assertion is also eloquently defeated by the example of Yugoslavia: she has succeeded in developing socialism and consolidating her socialist achievements, in spite of attempts to isolate her, and in spite of enormous difficulties which, regrettably, came from the socialist countries which should have helped the development of a socialist country. Despite all this, Yugoslavia has contrived to achieve the highest rate of increase in production in the world, and to make great advances in the development of socialist relations. In doing so, as is generally known, she has not made herself dependent, either politically or economically, on any country. At one time even the Soviet leaders admitted this. Of course, it is clear to everybody that co-operation on an equal footing and mutual assistance without political conditions of the other socialist countries would help a definite socialist country develop at a faster rate. The desire and efforts of Yugoslavia to foster such relations with the other socialist countries clearly speak of the attitude of the Yugoslav communists in this matter. But as regards theory, the thesis that socialist development outside the socialist camp is impossible, is untenable and unscientific, for socialism is the sum of live, objectively existing social relations in a country. They depend, first of all, on the internal material and social forces of any country embarking on the path of socialist development.

Apart from this, in the conditions of today all countries, socialist or not, are objectively in such mutual economic inter-dependence in world proportions as to render the thesis on the so-called isolated development of any country, even Yugoslavia, inconceivable from this point of view. Socialism as a social system opens up far more extensive prospects for such association of countries — without bloc, regional and similar barriers — but this will prove to be effective and in accordance with the real interests of the development of socialism, only provided the interests and the specific roads of development of each country are respected.

If it is not explicitly asserted that Yugoslavia is not a socialist country, what purpose is served by the thesis that the so-called isolated development of socialism "can lead" in the long run to the loss of the socialist achievements of the Yugoslav people? It is obvious that this is a reiteration, in the language of the programme, of the old thesis first put forward in the Resolution of the Informbureau, to the effect that the Yugoslav leaders are taking Yugoslavia along the road "of the distortion of socialism", that this is "a policy of liquidation" etc., etc. The Yugoslav

practice provides a sufficiently authoritative reply to this "thesis". The question, however, arises: if the thesis on the decisive dependence of socialism upon affiliation to the socialist camp were after all correct — what would socialist development be like in future? According to this thesis, socialism would expand only through the expansion of the camp in which there exists one "revolutionary centre" from which, as if in concentric circles, socialism would expand. This is the logic to which the authors strictly adhere. The same reasoning is applied when discussing the newly-liberated countries which, it is said, will follow a "non-capitalist path" — that is, one which is neither capitalist nor socialist — which is obviously pure nonsense from both the scientific and the political point of view.

It is clear from all this that this is not a question of a Yugoslav course of isolation. The attack is actually levelled against the independent and progressive socialist path of Yugoslavia, who has found her own specific forms of internal development and specific forms of activity in international relations. This time too, attempts are being made, not for any theoretical purpose, but for practical-political and narrow-camp interests and reasons, to discredit both the thesis on the different roads leading to socialism and that on the concrete, progressive and independent path to socialism taken by Yugoslavia; attempts are being made to demonstrate its alleged economic and political impossibility and it is being "prophesied" that any country building socialism outside the scope of the camp — accordingly, along its own independent path — will "degenerate", and that it will be absorbed by the imperialists. Furthermore, the purpose seems to be to justify in advance, ideologically and politically, any campaign which might be undertaken in the name of "real socialism" in order to "save" a country from such "degeneration".

We should like, however, to give the authors of the Programme a piece of advice: they would do better to make a serious analysis of internal problems in individual countries within the camp, as some of these problems are of such a nature as to be detrimental to world socialism in general, than to fret over the "fate" of Yugoslav socialism, whose successes and contribution to the affirmation of socialism in the world are generally known.

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES

It is also stated in the Draft that the communist parties are independent; that they are developing a policy based on concrete conditions in their country; that they are building mutual relations on the basis of equality and the principle of proletarian internationalism; that they are coordinating their actions voluntarily and consciously. The Yugoslav communists have for years been fighting consistently for such relations among the communist parties. But these statements sound far too declaratory when one recalls that in all other sections the emphasis is only on the camp unity of the socialist countries, while Yugoslavia is alleged, because of her independent path to socialism, to disunite peoples before the imperialist front. What is the meaning of this?

First of all, the authors of the Draft are fully aware of the fact that the Yugoslav communists have always, in words and in deeds — and in the most difficult days — fought for the unity of socialist and other progressive and peaceloving forces in the world. But there are special political reasons for ignoring this today.

There is no conflict concerning the need for the unity of the anti-imperialist and socialist forces. The differences are in the answer to the question: on what bases and with what methods should the unity of the socialist countries and movements in the world be achieved, and for what purpose? The Yugoslav communists consider that the full equality of countries and movements, the respect of the specific conditions of each country, independence of development and non-interference in internal affairs, are the prerequisites which will ensure that the unity and international association of socialist countries and movements are not mechanical but real and imbued with a profoundly progressive essence. Everybody will agree with the statement contained in the Draft Programme of the Soviet Communist Party:

"The proletariat that has come out victorious cannot impose happiness on any foreign people without thereby undermining its own victory."

But unfortunately this well-known conception sounds unconvincing in the Draft, for both in the words and the practice of our "critics" the camp association alone is considered to be real unity, and Yugoslavia's joining the camp is made a condition for her co-operation with other socialist countries.

There is no doubt that this reveals a policy which ignores the independence of the socialist countries and a bureaucratic-dogmatic conception of the unity of socialist countries and movements. According to this conception, there can be no unity without a strong camp, without an administrative association of socialist countries and parties directed from one centre. It is not hard to realize that this important question is still dominated by the old bureaucratic conceptions from the time of the inglorious Resolution of the Inform-bureau. This conception, either cannot or does not want to imagine a joint activity of socialist countries and forces in the world without the "unity" camp. Hence the proclamation of so-called Yugoslav revisionism — in fact the independent road to socialism — as the main danger "to the international communist movement". In connection with this, however, it should be stressed that capitalism, which is disappearing from the historic stage, is really not the main danger to bureaucracy. Its negation is socialism without bureaucratic distortions based on self-government by the working people, and democratic and equal relations among socialist countries and movements. In brief: Yugoslav communists give priority to the real unity of equal and free socialist countries and movements over administrative unity. This is the only way to overcome surviving hegemonic and monopolistic tendencies.

It is true though that the following statement is made in the Draft: "In the socialist camp or, which is exactly the same, in the world community of socialist countries, nobody has or can have any special rights or privileges". This is an essential principle. But why, in spite of this principle, is the practice different? This is especially so in relation to Yugoslavia, which has openly opposed this practice, for in the Draft Programme of the Soviet Communist Party she is accused, in the name of proletarian internationalism, of self-isolation and bourgeois nationalism, and all acts against her are justified by some special rights and privileges of the camp countries, in the interpretation of all socialist phenomena in the world. It appears that against socialist Yugoslavia anything is permissible, and that in relation to Yugoslavia, all formally proclaimed principles can be violated.

The roots of such practice are to be found on the next page. Let us start from the Draft Programme itself,

from the tenets in Chapter Six of the second part ("The Development of Communism in the USSR and Co-Operation of Socialist Countries").

"The country which is advancing towards communism facilitates and accelerates the progress towards communism of the entire world socialist system. By building up communism, the people of the Soviet Union are blazing a trail for the whole of mankind, they are checking through their own practice the correctness of these paths, they are discovering the difficulties, finding the means for their removal, and choosing the best forms and methods of communist development."

No doubt the country which first established socialist social relations has a special historic role. But it is strange to assert that this country, just because she was the first to take the socialist path, must also necessarily develop the best forms and methods of building communism. (It is a separate question just how scientific it is to grade socialist development in individual countries by applying metaphysically the terms socialism and communism.) If a country — any country — chose the best forms and methods of building socialism-communism for the whole of mankind, this would mean that all other experiences are inferior in quality or second-class; that all peoples who wish to build communism should follow only the path cleared by one country. The Yugoslav communists, starting from the very clear tenets of Lenin, hold that every country — and accordingly the Soviet Union as well — follows its own specific road to socialism; that consequently there exists the Soviet road, i.e., the Soviet experience of building socialism, just as there also exists the practice of other workers' movements and other countries and, therefore, other useful experiences which, in accordance with the given conditions, can be used in socialist construction by different countries, without imposition, but on an entirely voluntary basis, and in accordance with the real benefit which definite movements can derive from these experiences.

It is equally strange that some should be given rights which are withheld from others. Thus, referring to the Draft Programme of the Soviet Communist Party at a meeting of Soviet-Rumanian friendship on August 11, 1961, Nikita Khrushchev said:

"The tenets of the Programme are written primarily for our Party and our people. It contains our conscience, our aspirations and our outlook on the world..."

I repeat, the Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is the programme of action of our Party and our people."

The Yugoslav communists, it appears, have no right "to a conscience, aspirations and outlook on the world", for their tenets are proclaimed in the Programme as being revisionistic, destructive, etc.

A commentary devoted to the Draft Programme which recently appeared in "Pravda" contained the following passage:

"Every tenet in this Document is imbued with concern for the further growth of the power of the Soviet country, for the growth of her material and spiritual wealth, for the welfare and happiness of the Soviet people."

It is certain that the Yugoslav communists can only rejoice at every new success of the Soviet people, but one cannot help asking the question: "Why then are the Yugoslav communists denied the right to follow the path which is leading the Yugoslav peoples so surely towards the ever greater strengthening of socialist relations, and why are such aspirations called bourgeois nationalism?"

Bearing this in mind, yet another question must be

asked: What is the dispute over unity based on? Unity is not an absolute virtue. Its value depends on the aim it serves. In our opinion unity which requires of all socialist forces socialist internationalism is unity in the defence of peace and independence, unity in the recognition and defence of the right of every people to independent socialist development and to equality and, finally, unity in mutual support, when the vital interests of the existence and development of socialism are at stake.

Consequently, when discussing the dispute over "unity" the question arises: "Is it a matter of such questions as the defence of the existence and progress of socialism, the defence of the right of every people to independent socialist development free of foreign interference, the mutual support of all socialist and progressive forces in the world? Obviously, there is no dispute over these questions — at least as far as Yugoslav communists are concerned, for they have always estimated that socialist internationalism consists precisely in the consistent application of these principles. The dispute is obviously over a different matter, in fact, over the assertion that socialist Yugoslavia ought, in the name of "unity", to renounce her independent socialist creation, her independent outlook upon the contemporary social and political development of the world, and her paths and methods of struggle, which obviously have produced results. It stands to reason that this kind of "unity", apart from having no connection with socialist internationalism, has no connection with democratic relations between peoples on the socialist path. Even in socialism, some progress more rapidly in the development of socialist relations, while others lag behind. We do not wish to lag behind, and this is why we are not willing to renounce independence in our socialist creation, either within the country or in international relations. And this independence is exclusively in the service of socialism and its progress.

IN CONCLUSION

There are a number of other arguments denying the anti-Yugoslav tenets of the Draft Programme, but there is no need to quote them, for the simple reason that the authors of the Draft know that all these assertions are inventions. Consequently, it is obvious that the "concern" for Yugoslav socialism and all the alleged theoretical explanations contained in this document on Yugoslav "revisionism" is intended to justify all previous and perhaps future pressure against the independent development of Yugoslavia; that is, to justify discriminatory acts against socialist Yugoslavia, to encourage endeavours for her political isolation, and to leave the "critics" the role of political arbiter, and the monopoly in the interpretation of the scientific truths of Marxism-Leninism. And what is most important, it is apparent from all this that these "critics" of socialist Yugoslavia have not, even to this day, renounced their hegemonic aspirations towards Yugoslavia. This, unfortunately, is the real aim of the tenets of the Draft Programme, referred to, which, understandably, make doubtful other tenets contained in it.

There is no need to emphasize that the Yugoslav day-to-day practice will ignore these attacks against the socialist reality of Yugoslavia, just as it has done in the past 13 years. This time too, attempts at undermining Yugoslavia's independent and free socialist development will again prove futile against the unity of the Yugoslav peoples, who are engaged in constructive work in the building of new socialist relations in their country.

Points from the Press Conference

On October 6, Drago Kunc, Spokesman of the Yugoslav State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs held a press conference and answered questions asked by journalists on current problems.

Exchange of Messages between Tito and Khrushchev. — President Tito's message to President Khrushchev concerned nuclear tests. Premier Khrushchev's reply to this message is in accordance with the Soviet stand on this question".

President Tito's visit to Brazil. — "The new Brazilian government has renewed its invitation to President Tito to visit Brazil".

Session of the UNO General Assembly. — "Although the General Assembly opened in an extremely strained atmosphere, its work may be said to have been conducted calmly. The almost unanimous wish to seek the solution of controversial questions through negotiation was manifested, and the absolute necessity of intensifying UNO's activity in the solving of international problems was confirmed".

Developments in Syria. — "The Yugoslav Government fully approves all actions made by President Nasser in connection with this question. As regards actual developments in Syria, the Yugoslav views are known, since our press publishes exhaustive information on such matters".

Gromyko's visit. — The date of Soviet Minister Gromyko's visit to return that of Koča Popović, Yugoslav State Secretary of Foreign Affairs, is not yet fixed.

Relations with France after the Recognition of the Algerian Provisional Government. — "There are no new developments, and we see no reason why the Yugoslav decision to recognize formally the Provisional Government of the Republic of Algeria should have an unfavourable influence on our relation with France. Yugoslavia had already recognized the Algerian Government de facto some time ago. Now the Provisional Government of the Republic of Algeria is recognized de jure by a number of countries. In any case, it is known that the French Government is officially negotiating with the Provisional Government of the Republic of Algeria".

Tendentious comments on the Belgrade Conference. — The Belgrade Conference has been attacked by certain Western journals as well as by the Chinese and Albanian press: "This coincidence, surprising at first sight, and the biased and malicious comments on the Belgrade Conference show that the aims of peaceful and active co-existence of the non-aligned countries are alien to the instigators and authors of these comments".

Senator Humphrey's visit. — Before leaving for Europe where he will be visiting Yugoslavia from October 9 to 13, Senator Humphrey said that he did not consider Yugoslavia a free country: "Senator Humphrey's statement contains assertions which are completely arbitrary and without foundation. This statement is all the more inappropriate as it differs in tone and content from the practical and spirit of the relations existing between the U.S.A. and Yugoslavia".

Meetings and Talks

OFFICIAL:

Visit of the Leader of the Government of West Nigeria. — S. S. Akintole, Leader of the Government of West Nigeria, stayed on an official three-day visit in Yugoslavia. Following on talks between Premier Akintole and Miloš Minic, President of the Execu-

ive Council of the People's Republic of Serbia, attended by high functionaries from both sides, in which the development of friendly relations and economic cooperation between the two countries was discussed, a protocol on these talks was signed. Premier S. L. Akintolu was received by President Tito.

Admiral Panajotopoulos in Yugoslavia. — Admiral Panajotopoulos, Head of the Greek navy arrived on an official visit in Yugoslavia on September 30, as guest of Admiral Mate Jerković, the Yugoslav Naval chief.

Ivica Grgić in USA. — At the invitation of the USA Foreign Department, Ivica Grgić, President of the Economic Committee of the Federal Council of the Federal People's Assembly, left for the United States for a two-months' stay, in order to get acquainted with contemporary technological methods in industry and in institutions for geological prospecting.

Zoran Polič in Berlin. — Zoran Polič, Member of the Federal Executive Council, arrived in Berlin on October 6 to head the Yugoslav delegation at the celebration of the twelfth anniversary of the German Democratic Republic.

The Mayor of New Delhi in Belgrade. — Sam Nat, Mayor of New Delhi, stayed in Belgrade, in the first half of October as guest of Miljan Neoričić, President of the People's Committee.

Dr. Voja Djukanović in USA. — Dr. Voja Djukanović, Director of the Federal Institute for Health, arrived in the United States on October 10 on a two-month's visit as guest of the U.S. Foreign Department. He will attend the Congress of American Physicians in Detroit and visit various health centres and institutions in the United States.

Sudanese Minister in Yugoslavia. — Seliman Kosein, Assistant Minister of communication of the Sudan, stayed in Yugoslavia in the first half of October, as guest of Prvoslav Vasiljević, Director of the Union of Postal and Telegraph Offices.

SOCIALIST ALLIANCE

Visit of an Official of the Sudanese Union of the Republic of Mali. — Jakuba Maiga, Organizational Secretary of the Sudanese Union of the Republic of Mali and Vice-President of the Mali Parliament, stayed in Yugoslavia in the first half of October, when he had talks with members of the Federal Committee of the Socialist Alliance on questions concerning mutual cooperation.

STANDING CONFERENCE OF TOWNS

Visit of a delegation of the United Socialist Party of France. — On October 9 a delegation of the United Socialist Party of France, including M. Tanguy Prigent and M. Monboucher, members of the National Political Committee of the Party, arrived in Yugoslavia on a visit of thirteen days. The French socialists, who are guests of the Standing Conference of Towns, will study the system of local self-government and social self-management in Belgrade, and also in Croatia and Slovenia.

FEDERATION OF TRADE UNIONS

Delegation of the General Labour Confederation of Italy. — A delegation of the General Confederation of Labour in Italy, headed by Agostin Novella, Secretary General and President of the World Federation of Trade Unions, arrived in Yugoslavia on October 11 for a stay of twelve days. These represen-

tatives of the largest Italian trade union organization have come to Yugoslavia to return the visit paid by Svetozar Vukmanović, President of the Central Council of the Federation of Trade Unions of Yugoslavia, to the Confederation of Labour in 1959.

Meeting with Austrian Trade Union Officials. — Meetings between the representatives of the Central Councils of the Federations of Trade Unions of Yugoslavia and Austria took place in Pohorje near Maribor on September 30 and October 1. The Austrian delegation included Erich Hofstaetter, Rosa Weber and Alfred Streier secretaries of the Federation, while the Federation of Trade Unions of Yugoslavia were represented by Ico Siničić, Pepca Karidelj and Milan Basta, and others. A plan of future cooperation was drawn up at these meetings.

Jack Conway visited Svetozar Vukmanović. — Jack Conway, an American Trade Union Official of long standing, and Director in the USA Government's Committee for Housing Problems, discussed with Svetozar Vukmanović, President of the Federation of Trade Unions of Yugoslavia, the relations between the Yugoslav and the American Trade Unions, and the situation in the international Trade Union Movement.

FEDERATION OF VETERANS OF THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION WAR OF YUGOSLAVIA

Visit of the Vice-President of the World Federation of Veterans. — During his three days' stay in Yugoslavia, the Vice-President of the World Federation of War Veterans and President of the Federation of Association of War Veterans of Nigeria had talks with the Federal Council of the Federation of Veterans of the People's Liberation War of Yugoslavia concerning cooperation with the Nigerian Veterans, within the framework of the World Federation of War Veterans.

PEOPLE'S YOUTH ORGANIZATION

Japanese Youth Organization Official in Yugoslavia. — Suitshi Sakata, Member of the Executive Board of the Council of Japanese Youth Organizations, stayed in Yugoslavia in the middle of October, and had talks with the representatives of the Central Committee of the People's Youth Organization of Yugoslavia.

SERBIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH

Patriarch German in USSR. — At the invitation of Reverend Aleksej, Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church, Reverend German, Patriarch of the Serbian and Macedonian Orthodox Church left for Moscow, accompanied by other eminent clerics.

Negotiations and Agreements

ECONOMY

Exchange of Goods with Poland. — Trade negotiation between Polish delegation, headed by Tadeus Kropotshinsky, Minister of Foreign Trade, and a Yugoslav delegation, headed by Vujica Gajinović, Assistant President of the Foreign Trade Committee, began in Belgrade early in October.

Trade Agreement with France. — By an exchange of letters between the Yugoslav and French Governments on October 9, the validity of the Yugoslav-French Trade Agreement is extended for a year.

Long-Term Economic Agreement with Ghana. — The negotiations between the economic delegations of Yugoslavia and Ghana, which ended in Belgrade on October 11, resulted in the signature of three agreements: a long-term agreement on trade, economic cooperation and navigation; a payments agreement; and an agreement on economic, scientific and technical cooperation, under which Yugoslavia will increase Ghana's credit for purchasing Yugoslav equipment from 1.8 million pounds sterling to 3.6 million. The agreements were signed by Sergej Krajcer, Member of the Federal Executive Council, and Krobo Edusei, Minister of Heavy and Light Industry in Ghana.

SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION

Equipment for a Nuclear Reactor. — Slobodan Nakićenović, State Under-Secretary in the Federal Committee for Nuclear Energy, signed an agreement with representatives of the International Agency for Atomic Energy and the American Committee for Atomic Energy in Vienna on October 5, for the delivery to Yugoslavia of a research reactor and the necessary nuclear fuel, within the framework of technical assistance rendered by the International Agency. The reactor is destined for the "Jožef Stefan" Institute of Ljubljana and is scheduled to be completed in 1963.

New Rouble-Dinar Rate of Exchange. — Under the agreement on scientific and technical cooperation between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, the State Bank of the U.S.S.R. will settle separate accounts with the Yugoslav National Bank at the rate of 600 dinars per dollar. According to the decision of the State Secretariat for Finance, the rate of 666.67 dinars per rouble (the former rate was 833.33) will be applied to all payments under the said agreement.

SOCIAL INSURANCE

Convention with Switzerland. — In the first half of October preliminary negotiations were conducted in Belgrade concerning the conclusion of a convention on social insurance between Yugoslavia and Switzerland.

ASSOCIATION OF JURISTS

Cooperation with Polish Jurists. — Meetings of Yugoslav and Polish Jurists were held in Belgrade and in Opatija in the first half of October. The Yugoslavs reported on the principles of administrative procedure, on the legal control of administrative records, and on economic crimes, and the Poles on the protection of socially owned property, on criminal legislation, and on administrative proceedings in Poland.

Political Diary

October 6 — A meeting of the Presidency of the Federal Committee of the Federation of Associations of Veterans of the People's Liberation War of Yugoslavia was held, with Aleksandar Ranković as the chairman. The final text of the Federation's Statute was adopted. The Council for investigating problems of war

veterans was nominated (Raja Nedeljković was appointed President), and Commission of the Federation of Wounded War Veterans (with Petar Brajović as President), of Reservists and Non-Commissioned Officers, (with Vjekoslav Kolb as President), of Former Political Prisoners, Internees and Deportees, (with Radomir Jerić as President) and Former War Prisoners (with Nikola Milanović as President) were elected.

October 7 — A protest note was handed to the Chargé d'Affaires of the People's Republic of Albania in the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs in connection with the trial of Albanian spies in Skoplje.

Diplomatic Diary

October 1 — Franc Primožić, Head of Department in the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs, was appointed Yugoslav Ambassador to Iraq.

October 1 — Nikola Miličević, Head of Department in the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs, was appointed Yugoslav Ambassador to Pakistan.

Review of INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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